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Confrontations between trademarks law and public-health interests are 
increasing in both frequency and severity.1  Trademarks—words, colors, signs, 
shapes, and other distinguishing marks that convey the origin and quality of 
goods or services2—provide an opportunity for firms to simply and 
inexpensively associate their products with desirable quality and price in the 
mind of the consumer.3  Laws against counterfeiting or infringing trademarks 
protect firms’ investments in the quality of their goods and preserve 
consumers’ interest in an inexpensive source of product information.4  Without 
these protections, competitors may, through flagrant or subtle imitation, “free 
ride” on those investments to the detriment of trademark holders.5  When these 
imitators supply inferior or hazardous goods, consumers and trademark holders 
are adversely affected.6  This fundamental mutual benefit provided by 
trademark protection has successfully persuaded many legislators, primarily in 
industrialized states, to steadily increase the reach of trademark protection.7  
                                                 
 1. See infra Part I.C. 
 2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (9th ed. 2009). 
 3. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) (explaining how trademarks efficiently communicate product 
information to consumers). 
 4. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwil,l in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 555–56 (2006). 
 5. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 327, 333–34 (2009) (commenting that one purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers 
from the passing off of imitation goods). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect 
trademarks from “infringement,” which is broadly defined as the unauthorized use of a mark 
“likely to cause confusion” with an already registered or established trademark.  See 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 1114, 1125 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  In 1996, Congress further authorized holders of famous 
trademarks to enjoin conduct that “diluted” the uniqueness of the trademark.  Trademark Dilution 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–86 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)).  Under the current dilution provision, the trademark holder does not have to 
show that a purported dilutor’s conduct might confuse the consumer, only that the use may blur or 
tarnish a valuable mark by associating it with unrelated goods or casting it in an unflattering light.  
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These protections have, in turn, made their way into the rapidly expanding 
network of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties between 
developed states and developing or middle-income states.8  As a result, 
trademark proprietors currently enjoy stronger protections in more jurisdictions 
than ever before.9   
Not all trademarks, however, serve the dual purposes of incentivizing 
investments in quality and preserving consumer expectations.  Some 
trademarks obscure relevant product information, minimize product risks, or 
suggest product attributes that are difficult or impossible to verify.10  For 
example, cigarette manufacturers used “light” and “mild” descriptors in their 
brands to persuade smokers that such cigarettes constituted healthier 
alternatives to “full flavor” cigarettes.11  Government-mandated warnings for 
                                                                                                                 
See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730–32 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 2010)); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1839 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (acknowledging the strength of Toys “R” Us’s 
dilution claim against adultsrus.com, a website offering a line of sexual products because it 
disparaged the famous Toys “R” Us name). 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See Burton Ong, The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, in 
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 229, 230 
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) [hereinafter TRADEMARK LAW AND 
THEORY] (“Similarly, trademark law provisions which have found their way into bilateral free 
trade agreements are also intended to fortify and, in most cases, expand the domestic legal 
framework from which trademark owners derive their exclusive rights.”); Poppy S. Winanti, 
Explaining Change in Developing Countries’ Intellectual Property Legislation: The Case Studies 
of Indonesia and India 1 (Apr. 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2011/108_86.pdf (“The TRIPs Agreement went substantially 
beyond the existing intellectual property (IP) regime under the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), by establishing minimum standards for members’ domestic IP laws, with 
respect to terms and scope of protection for a wide range of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
categories under a single multilateral agreement.  Its negotiation process exhibited relentless 
attempts of developing countries to resist the adoption of the agreement, because of the concerns 
about the difference in philosophical strands, and the administrative costs associated with 
implementing the agreement.  Despite their objections, however, almost all developing countries 
have altered their domestic laws in response to the TRIPs Agreement, many did so prior to the 
deadline for implementation, and many adopted more rigorous IP rules than required by TRIPs.”). 
 10. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2006) (enjoining tobacco companies from using 
deceptive brand descriptors on cigarette packages to obscure health risks and concerns), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 556 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 11. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d at 27.  In United States v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., the U.S. government brought a RICO claim against several tobacco companies for 
false representations regarding nicotine levels in “light” and “low” tar cigarettes.  Id. at 26–27.  
The lengthy opinion provides an excellent survey of tobacco firms’ collusive efforts to hide 
smoking-related risks from consumers in the United States.  Id.  Similarly, Philip Morris 
International’s subsidiaries in Uruguay introduced trademark variations on cigarettes with a 
marketing objective designed to deceive consumers: 
Our anchorman shall add credibility to the product’s deliveries which will be compared 
to Galaxy (soft pack) in order to stress that the normal Galaxy is the “Intelligent 
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alcoholic beverages often appear in the decorative marks that adorn product 
containers.12  In countries with large illiterate populations, the importance of 
colors, symbols, and signs for both marketing and regulation places these 
interests in regular conflict.13  Legal scholars, legislators, judges, and 
regulators have struggled to develop and apply rules that balance the interest in 
using trademarks as helpful product indicators for consumers and the interest 
of protecting consumers from misleading information or predatory 
marketing.14  These two trends—expanding protections for trademarks and the 
costs that trademark protections impose on consumers—are increasingly in 
tension.15 
In order to balance these interests, legislators and regulators have considered 
prohibiting the use of certain trademarks,16 selectively limiting specific aspects 
of trademarks, requiring that disclosures and warnings accompany 
trademarks,17 or doing nothing at all, allowing market incentives to encourage 
one competitor to build a reputation for consumer-friendly practices or to 
advertise negative product attributes of a rival’s goods.18   
                                                                                                                 
Decision” combining low tar and nicotine with smoking pleasure but if the smoker 
wishes the lowest numbers in a very sophisticated cigarette.  Galaxy Ultra Lights is 
lower in its deliveries than Galaxy.  Since consumers believe that Galaxy and Coronado 
Ultra Lights have more or less the same deliveries, with Coronado Ultra Lights only 
slightly lower, this advertising will also position Galaxy Ultra Lights as lower than 
Coronado Ultra Lights.  Galaxy Ultra Light’s pack design shall be stressed in order to 
clearly communicate its high level of sophistication. 
Submission from R.W. Murray, Philip Morris Int’l, to Corporate Products Committee, New 
Product Introduction, Galaxy Ultra Lights (Sept. 3, 1984), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf. 
edu/tid/oaa29e00/pdf. 
 12. Press Release, Ctr. for Science in the Pub. Interest, Alcohol Warning Labels Go 
Unnoticed, Poll Finds (Aug. 17, 2001), available at http://www.cspinet.org/booze/batf 
_labels2001_press.htm (quoting a poll administrator who stated that “the poll data clearly show 
that consumers think the warning statement was designed specifically not to be noticed”). 
 13. See, e.g., Tobacco Products Should Sport More Graphic Warnings: Survey, SIFY.COM 
(Nov. 26, 2010, 9:20 PM), http://www.sify.com/news/tobbaco-products-should-sport-more-
graphic-warnings-survey-news-health-kl0vujiecgg.html (describing the desire of people in India 
to have strong pictoral warnings on tobacco products and the resistance from tobacco companies). 
 14. See infra notes 16–30; see also infra Part I.B. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1203.02 (6th ed. 2010) (stating that federal trademark statutes provide a complete 
bar to the use of deceptive trademarks); Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademarks: The Case of 
Tobacco, WORLD TRADE REV. 53, 59 (2004) (describing British authorities’ refusal of 
trademarks due to their tendency to mislead). 
 17. See, e.g., J. Craig Andrews, Richard G. Netemeyer & Srinivas Durvasula, Believability 
and Attitudes Toward Alcohol Warning Label Information: The Role of Persuasive 
Communications Theory, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 1 (1990) (discussing U.S. regulations 
mandating warning requirements on alcohol packaging). 
 18. See Mark Armstrong, Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 87, 103 (2008) (highlighting the primacy of a firm’s reputation when 
the firm attempts to identify positive attributes of its own products and negative attributes of 
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When challenging regulations, trademark holders characterize their marks 
either as speech or as property, depending on which will better defeat or deter 
proposed restrictions.19  For example, when the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) released its proposed graphic warning labels for 
cigarette packs, tobacco companies argued not only that the labels forced them 
to communicate a message not of their own choosing in violation of the First 
Amendment, but also that the labels “confiscat[ed]” the visual displays of their 
trademarks in violation of the Fifth Amendment.20  As speech, trademarks 
arguably enjoy a high level of protection from regulation.21  In many 
                                                                                                                 
competitors’ products); see also Jean Wegman Burns, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act 
Standing, 42 UCLA L. REV. 47, 76 (1994) (discussing sellers’ market incentives not to falsely 
advertise); Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 487, 498 (1993) (discussing comparative advertising). 
 19. See Jude A. Thomas, Fifteen Years of Fame: The Declining Relevance of Domain 
Names in the Enduring Conflict Between Trademark and Free Speech Rights, 11 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13 (2011) (commenting that trademark regulation can be said to 
encapsulate both property and free-speech interests).  In recent years, the most heated policy and 
scholarly debates have revolved around trademarks as corporate speech and the extent to which 
firms’ efforts to persuade consumers deserve the same protections as social and political 
expression.  See id.; see also Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a 
Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 151–52, 188–99 (2005) (“The commercial 
speech doctrine had been under pressure almost from its inception.”). 
 20. Saundra Young, FDA Reveals Bigger, Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarette Packages, 
CNN.COM (June 21, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/06/21/cigarette 
.labels/index.html (highlighting the argument that new FDA warning labels “confiscate” tobacco 
trademarks). 
 21. This is arguably the case in the United States.  See Transp. Alts., Inc. v. City of New 
York, 218 F. Supp. 2d 423, 437–38 (2002) (“The conclusion that a corporation’s marks are 
commercial speech even when used in connection with an event that is fully protected by the First 
Amendment is further supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in San Francisco Arts  
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,” in which the Court held that “[t]o the 
extent that [the statute] applies to uses [of ‘Olympic’] for the purpose of trade [or] to induce the 
sale of any goods or services its application is to commercial speech.” (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and 
Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND 
THEORY, supra note 9, at 294, 294–95 (discussing the problem with distinguishing commercial 
and noncommercial speech).  Trademarks are starting to enjoy greater protection at the 
international level as well.  See Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to 
Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 407 (2010) (“With the recent expansion of 
trademark rights and the increased protection of speech—including commercial expression—
there are a growing number of potential conflicts between laws prohibiting unauthorized use of 
another’s mark and the right to freedom of expression.”); see also Unconstitutionality Claim Brief 
for Nobleza Piccardo at 29, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme 
Court of Justice], “Nobleza Piccardo S.A.I.C. Y F. c. Provincia de Santa Fe,” 188/2006 (Arg.) 
[hereinafter Nobeleza Piccardo Unconstitutionality Claim] (arguing that trademarks deserve  
free-speech protection under Argentine law).  However, other jurisdictions require balancing of 
all individual interests—including, equally, property and speech—as do many international 
instruments.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
330 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:325 
jurisdictions, speech is part of the fundamental right to identify the  
self22—even the corporate self.23  Therefore, regulations must be narrowly 
tailored to meet a well-defined and significant public interest.24  The 
government often bears the evidentiary burdens to prove either that a 
regulation advances a compelling objective or that the speech is undeserving of 
protection, such as being deceptive or misleading.25  Property, on the other 
hand, receives different, arguably less protection.26  Although some nations’ 
constitutions create a default right to private-property ownership, others 
explicitly vest all real-property ownership with the state, which may establish 
processes for the transfer of real property to private owners or managers.27  
Regardless of initial entitlements, many jurisdictions permit the state to 
condemn private property for public use, provided that the owner receives a 
reasonable compensation.28  The property owner may carry the initial burden 
                                                                                                                 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice.  (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this 
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect 
of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public  
order . . . or of public health or morals.”). 
 22. S. African Nat’l Defence Union v. Minister of Defence & Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) 
para. 8 (S. Afr.) (“These rights [of free expression] taken together protect the rights of individuals 
not only individually to form and express opinions, of whatever nature, but to establish 
associations and groups of like-minded people to foster and propagate such opinions. The rights 
implicitly recognise the importance, both for a democratic society and for individuals personally, 
of the ability to form and express opinions, whether individually or collectively, even where those 
views are controversial.”); see also R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 734–35 (Can.) (holding 
that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees free speech, regardless of the 
content’s popularity). 
 23. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has 
recognized that the First Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] applies to corporations.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 24. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the 
government’s interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption permitted campaign-finance 
limitations under the First Amendment). 
 25. See, e.g., Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 734 (“Before a person can be denied the protection of [free 
speech], it must be certain that there can be no justification for offering protection.”); see also 
Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 26. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the 
Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1567–68 (2008) (analyzing the ease with which 
political authorities may compensate for the loss of a property right relative to the loss of a speech 
right). 
 27. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”), with Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], 
art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) [The Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States] (“The ownership of lands and waters comprised 
within the limits of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and 
has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property.”). 
 28. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) 
2012] International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health 331 
of proving the value of the property taken by the state.29  However, the threat 
of paying significant compensation to an owner may deter regulation.30  
This Article is principally concerned with a property-based approach to 
trademark regulation.  It proposes that trademarks are better characterized as 
property for purposes of public-health and consumer-protection regulation.  
First, although trademarks are certainly like speech in the sense that they are 
intended to distinguish the speaker and perform an informational function, for 
purposes of regulation, their property attributes overshadow their speech 
attributes.31  The basic motivation of trademark law is to give the trademark 
proprietor the right to exclude others and control use.32  In many jurisdictions, 
trademarks may be freely bought, sold, or licensed.33  Trademark holders’ 
rights are essentially a privilege granted by the state,34 and trademarks are 
regularly assigned an objectively determined monetary value.35  Second, the 
                                                                                                                 
(“Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public utility, and upon payment 
of compensation.”). 
 29. Town of Williams v. Perrin, 217 P.2d 918, 919 (Ariz. 1950) (noting that the property 
owner carries the burden of establishing damages in an eminent-domain proceeding); Shawn H.T. 
Denstedt & Ryan V. Rodier, What Happens When Developers Can’t Develop?: Can and Should 
Resource Developers Be Compensated When They Can’t Develop Their Assets?, 48 ALBERTA L. 
REV. 331, 332, 355 (2010) (comparing takings jurisprudence from Australia, Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, and noting that at common law in Canada, “‘the burden of proof 
of market value rests on the owner of the expropriated property,’ but matters before expropriation 
compensation tribunals are ‘more in the nature of an investigation than a trial so the onus rests on 
neither party.’” (quoting Casamiro Resource v. British Columbia (1993), 50 L.C.R. 99, 141, 143 
(Can. B.C.E.C.B.), aff’d, 2000 BCCA 407, 76 B.C.L.R.3d 303)).  There are, of course, other 
approaches.  For example, under the World Trade Organization regime, the favored resolution for 
a trade dispute is for a member state to “bring the measure into conformity with th[e] agreement 
[covered by the WTO].”  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 19, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm#ftnt9.  However, even under WTO 
dispute resolution, binding arbitration is a possible and frequently used mechanism.  See infra 
notes 53–54. 
 30. See, e.g., KONRAD VON MOLTKE & HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., TOWARDS A SOUTHERN AGENDA ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: DISCUSSION PAPER 
ON THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 30 (2004), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_sai.pdf (explaining the “regulatory chill” resulting from 
the specter of large arbitration awards and costly litigation in the context of international 
investment agreements); see also infra note 123 (discussing Uruguay’s hesitation to proceed with 
its trademark regulation in the face of a potentially large award for an indirect expropriation of 
tobacco trademarks). 
 31. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 32. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 33. Cheryl L. Hodgson, Registration and Ownership of Music Group Names in the Digital 
Age, 17 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 5 (2000). 
 34. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Elizabeth L. Warren-Mikes, Note, December Madness: The Seventh Circuit’s 
Creation of Dual Use in Illinois High School Association v. GTE Vantage, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
332 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:325 
increasingly influential international instruments protecting trademarks largely 
adopt a property-based approach.36  These instruments generally characterize 
trademarks as “investments” or “property” and, in varying levels of detail, 
articulate trademark holders’ ability to alienate their marks and to enjoy legal 
protection from counterfeit or infringement as well as compensation in the 
event of a regulatory taking.37  For example, under Article 1110 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), if Canada, the United States, or 
Mexico adopts a trademark restriction, and even if it is based on a theory of 
unprotected speech, the trademark holder arguably has a right to compensation 
for an expropriation.38  
This Article uses a property-based perspective on trademark regulation to 
focus on an emerging problem confronting arbitrators, judges, and lawmakers 
deciding trademark holders’ claims against the state: how should adjudicators 
                                                                                                                 
1009, 1019 (1999) (explaining the relationship between a company’s goodwill and the 
corresponding monetary value assigned to its trademark). 
 36. See Protocol on Harmonization of Norms on Intellectual Property in Mercosur in 
Matters of Trademarks, Indications of Source and Appellation of Origin art. 11, Aug. 5, 1995, 
2145 U.N.T.S. 460, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/12/10/5009.pdf 
(granting the registered trademark owner exclusive rights and the ability to prevent others from 
using like items in commerce); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (mirroring language in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and conferring an exclusive right of use to the registered 
trademark owner); North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1708, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (providing the trademark owner with the right 
to exclude others from using identical or similar items for commercial gain); Council Directive 
2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 61 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu (obliging the 
member states to implement adequate measures for the protection of intellectual-property rights). 
 37. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, at arts. 1109–10; see also Vicki Been & Joel C. 
Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided 
Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 133–34 (2003) 
(detailing cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris’s legal argument that a Canadian ban on the use of 
certain words on product packaging would violate NAFTA by expropriating its trademarks). 
 38. NAFTA, supra note 36, at art. 1110; see also Been & Beauvais, supra note 37, at  
133–34 (“In 2001, Philip Morris used similar tactics [as R.J. Reynolds, which asserted that it 
would claim significant compensation from the Canadian government if it passed plain packaging 
legislation,] to oppose a proposed ban on the use of the words ‘light’ and ‘mild’ on cigarette 
packaging in Canada: The company argued that the terms are an integral part of their registered 
trademarks and that the ban would violate Article 1110 by expropriating these trademarks and 
associated goodwill.” (footnotes omitted)); Letter from Carla A. Hills, Partner, Mudge Rose 
Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. & Philip Morris Int’l, Inc., Legal 
Opinion with Regard to Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products Requirement Under International 
Agreements 10–11 (May 3, 1994), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mrm97c00 
/pdf;jsessionid=A3117ED107B55ABA9B7E88C0C6C724A2.tobacco03 (analyzing how a  
plain-packaging regime for cigarettes would violate NAFTA’s trademark protections and thus 
“giv[e] rise to massive compensation claims”). 
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arrive at appropriate compensation for a trademark “taken” by the state?39  In 
other words, what does a condemnation proceeding for trademarks look like?  
This Article argues that such a proceeding should adhere to the fundamental 
principles underlying trademark law: protection of fair competition and 
reduction of consumer information costs.40   
When a state adopts a law or regulation that diminishes a trademark’s value, 
a trademark holder is under an initial obligation to show that the regulation has 
the effect of causing consumers to switch to competing goods or services.41  
This burden corresponds to the ultimate purpose of trademark law: allowing 
firms to distinguish their products from other firms’ products.42  A regulating 
authority would be able to rebut a trademark holder’s initial showing by 
proving the regulation’s informational benefit to consumers.43  These burdens 
correspond to both the origin of trademark as a state-granted privilege44 and 
                                                 
 39. The problem also does not lend itself easily to Coasean bargaining because one party is 
the state and the property rights are arguably not well-defined.  See R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (explaining how well-defined property rights should 
facilitate optimal exchanges). 
 40. Bone, supra note 4, at 555–56; Lemley, supra note 3, at 1690. 
 41. Itamar Simonson, Trademark Infringement from the Buyer Perspective: Conceptual 
Analysis and Measurement Implications, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTS. 181, 181 (1994) (“The key 
test of trademark infringement is the likelihood of confusion (LOC) between trademarks.”); see 
also David S. Bloch & James G. McElwen, “Like Toddlers in Big Surf”: Can the Government 
Control the Effects of Federal Trademark Liability?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 209, 227 (2003) (noting 
that in a trademark-infringement claim, an injunction is the only remedy that will cease consumer 
confusion arising from the infringement). 
 42. Frederick R. Zufert & T. Robert Rehm, Jr., Intellectual Property: Fueling the Health 
Care Reform Engine, 11 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTEL. PROP. L. 147, 157 (2011). 
 43. See Alberto R. Salazar V., NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic 
Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 37 (2010) (noting that NAFTA 
recognizes an exception to expropriation when the regulatory body does so in the pursuit of the 
public interest).  Several scholars have explored variations of the argument that government 
should not just pay compensation in the case of a regulatory taking, but should be entitled to its 
benefits.  Without suggesting any coherence in the literature on this issue, the argument asserted 
here differs from previous contributions because the “bundle” of rights included in the trademark 
property protection are so dependent on somewhat arbitrary government largesse.  Felix S. 
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 875 
(1935) (noting the circular relationship between legal protection of a trademark and its value); see 
also Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 362–63 (2000) (discussing how the public-interest 
factor does not play a major role in the government’s internalization of constitutional costs); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 
1583–84 (1986) (arguing that requiring the government to compensate for regulatory takings will 
only result in responsible decision making if the government in fact acts in the public interest); 
John Quinn & Michael J. Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change, 
32 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 135 (1982) (noting that uncertainty in government decision making 
makes it difficult to predict how compensation would affect the process). 
 44. See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranion, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The 
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKLEY 
TECH. L.J. 1363, 1398 (2006) (“[F]ederal trademark protection is a strictly statutory creation.”). 
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the state’s power to inform and protect consumers.45   A trademark holder may, 
however, be able to show that a proposed regulation should be prohibited 
because it is unjustifiably discriminatory,46 and the state may be able to show 
that for some product categories, such as digestible goods, it is under no 
obligation to pay compensation.47  The close relationship between the latter 
form of goods and human health entitles the state to partially or wholly 
prohibit the use of a trademark.48 
Significant normative implications surround the regulation of trademarks.  
Some scholars and advocates argue that the state should enjoy wide flexibility 
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit trademarks when their underlying or suggested 
messages may mislead consumers, especially with regard to product risks.49  
These arguments arise from the state’s essential role of ensuring fundamental 
constitutional or human rights in health, safety, and information.50  In contrast, 
trademark holders, which invest vast sums of money to create an independent 
value in the minds of consumers,51 argue that their entire investment deserves 
protection for the benefit of both firms and consumers.52   
This Article acknowledges the importance of these normative debates, but 
nevertheless offers two main reasons for adopting a cost-benefit method of 
scrutinizing trademark regulation.  First, many of the fora in which trademark 
holders assert their claims, such as international arbitration facilities, are 
simply more accustomed to calculating objective values than ascertaining 
                                                 
 45. George Miaoulis & Nancy D’Amato, Consumer Confusion & Trademark Infringement, 
42 J. MARKETING 48, 48 (1978) (recognizing trademarks’ role of providing consumers with the 
tools necessary to make informed decisions when purchasing products); see supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 46. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Salazar, supra note 43, at 51–52 (contending that regulations aimed at protecting 
public health, such as food warnings, should be permitted despite NAFTA’s prohibition on 
property expropriation). 
 48. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 49. See, e.g., McGrady, supra note 16, at 59 (“Member States possess the regulatory 
freedom to cancel existing trademarks [with deceptive terms] and to deny registration of 
trademarks of this type in the future.  It is irrelevant that the terms may also describe taste or have 
a legitimate non-deceptive purpose.”); see also Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International 
Protection of Trademarks After the TRIPS Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 189, 210 
(1998) (arguing that even under international trade agreements, governments enjoyed the ability 
to “include an indication that the product has been manufactured by a licensee or a restriction of 
the use with certain products such as tobacco”); Valentina S. Vadi, Trade Mark Protection, 
Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains and Paradoxes, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 773, 
802 (2009) (“Public health or salus publica lies at the very heart of state sovereignty, as the basic 
duty of government is maintaining and enhancing the well-being of its people.”). 
 50. See supra note 49. 
 51. BR Rutherford, Misappropriation of the Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade 
Names and Service Marks, 2 S. AFR. MERCENTILE L.J. 151, 152 (1990). 
 52. Id. (“The growth of his business is dependent upon the growth of the meaning and 
importance of his trade mark. It is therefore only fair that he should be entitled to protect this 
valuable asset against misappropriation.”). 
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subjective rights located in national or international legal instruments.53  
Eventually, a dispute resolution panel—whether it is convened under the 
NAFTA, the WTO, or another agreement—will issue a judgment in a dispute 
between a trademark holder and a regulator.54  Trademark proprietors almost 
exclusively articulate the standard for such an award, without the benefit of a 
comprehensive analytical approach.55  Second, cost-benefit analysis gives 
regulators a way to analyze the breadth and scope of proposed regulations, 
especially when those regulations may cause the state to incur substantial costs 
related to a takings claim or to disadvantage particular trademark holders 
through misguided or poorly conceived rules.56  Articulating the compensable 
value of trademarks through this framework will also assist regulators in 
domestic jurisdictions, such as the United States, that will grapple with 
trademark takings.57 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the debate surrounding the 
confrontations between the purpose of trademarks and states’ interests in 
protecting public health and ensuring that accurate and effective product 
information reaches consumers.  Part II addresses the theoretical underpinnings 
of trademark protection and the current bases upon which trademark value is 
now determined.  Part III outlines the framework for ascertaining the property 
                                                 
 53. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt 
Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 366 (2006) (arguing that creditors hesitate to submit 
disputes to arbitration because arbitrators issue “split the difference” awards); Jens Dammann  
& Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34 (2008) 
(noting the lack of predictability in arbitration awards and contending that because “arbitrators are 
commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest 
in rendering decisions that will maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in future 
disputes . . . [provides arbitrators with] an incentive to render compromised judgments that do not 
badly offend either party”); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of 
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 634 (1988) (“Arbitrators, unlike judges, often 
have an incentive to make disputants equally happy or unhappy because they are paid by the 
parties rather than by the state.”). 
 54. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, at arts. 1116–17 (permitting parties to submit 
investment disputes to arbitration); see also David Elward, Tribunal Chosen in Uruguay Tobacco 
Dispute, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news 
/article/29336/ (reporting that an arbitration panel is already considering a trademark dispute 
between Philip Morris International and Uruguay involving Uruguay’s cigarette-packaging laws). 
 55. See infra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (discussing several proceedings wherein 
trademark holders have persuaded tribunals that the state must compensate for regulatory 
“takings” of trademarks). 
 56. See Quinn & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 135 (suggesting that a cost-benefit analysis 
would foreclose legislators from regulating according to personal preference and would instead 
require consideration of the actual costs for the public). 
 57. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1998) (challenging a 
disclosure law for cigarette ingredients as an unconstitutional taking); Robert K. Hur, Takings, 
Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450 n.18 (2000) 
(listing the various sources criticizing takings jurisprudence in the United States); Young, supra 
note 20 (reporting that the two largest U.S. tobacco companies allege that the government is 
“confiscating” half of the package space by requiring new warning labels). 
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interest in a trademark and allocating to the trademark proprietor and the state 
their corresponding evidentiary burdens in regulatory-takings claims.  Part IV 
outlines the principles for determining the appropriate range for total 
prohibitions, including the standard for trademark holders to enjoin regulation 
or for the state to engage in non-compensable regulatory takings.  Finally, Part 
V concludes that a fact-specific cost-benefit analysis is the best way to balance 
the interests of trademark proprietors and state regulators of public health. 
I.  THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
REGULATION 
A.  Theoretical Justifications for Trademark Protections 
Trademarks occupy a legal space that partially overlaps with other 
intellectual properties like patents and copyrights.58  Protections for the latter 
forms of intellectual property are justified in substantial part by the perceived 
value of securing reasonable and limited incentives for creators to invent.59  By 
contrast, trademark law offers incentives for businesses to invest in the quality 
and uniqueness of their goods and to convey quality through combinations of 
words, colors, signs, shapes, and other distinguishing marks;60 however, the 
purported social goal is focused on consumers’ information costs.61  
Trademark law protects distinguishing symbols, images, and logos because 
consumers benefit from having an inexpensive way to inform themselves about 
goods and services.62  When manufacturers successfully associate their 
products with desirable quality and price in the mind of the consumer, they 
reduce the consumer’s cost of deciding which type or brand of their products to 
purchase in the future.63  The basic motivation of trademark law is to protect 
                                                 
 58. See William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1547, 1557–58 (2006) (discussing the distinctions between trademark law and patent 
and copyright laws). 
 59. Id. at 1558; see, e.g., Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the goals of 
the patent system and the incentive for creators to develop and disseminate scientific knowledge 
for public benefit), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., 
Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1979) (providing that the incentives granted to patent holders 
encourages scientific investments in new inventions). 
 60. Ridgeway, supra note 58, at 1557–58. 
 61. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1690; Miaoulis & D’Amato, supra note 45, at 48. 
 62. J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The Informational Function of Trademarks, 
41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991, 999 (2009) (“Because a trademark denotes a single (if anonymous) source 
of manufacture, a trademark assures the consumer that the product is the same as the one she 
previously experienced.  For the first-time consumer, it assures that the product is the same as the 
one recommended to her.  Thus, a trademark, regardless of the information it provides about the 
product itself, economizes the consumer’s search costs.”). 
 63. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (applying economic efficiency arguments to 
2012] International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health 337 
this mutually beneficial relationship by prohibiting one economic competitor’s 
encroachment on investments in product distinction made by another.64  Laws 
against counterfeiting and trademark infringement, for example, protect the 
successful trademark holder from “free riders” that may inappropriately benefit 
from the trademark holder’s investments in quality or jeopardize those 
investments by supplying a product or service of inferior quality.65  The 1988 
film Coming to America provides a classic illustration of this relationship.66  
The film showcases Cleo McDowell, the proprietor of “McDowell’s” 
restaurant, who employed “golden arcs” as the restaurant’s brand identifier, 
which provoked conflict with “McDonald’s” and its “golden arches.”67  
Trademark law is meant to protect McDonald’s from Cleo McDowell, as well 
as protect hungry consumers from being misled about their preferred products.  
Trademark law, therefore, largely focuses on transactions or relationships 
between private parties, including transactions among competitors and between 
competitors and consumers.68 
Trademark protections stimulate investments in product quality, product 
advertising, or both,69 depending on the industry sector and the distorting 
influence of credit and tax regimes.70  Advertising investments increase sales 
and cash flow, and research-and-development investments contribute to firms’ 
creation of improved products and thus enhance their competitive position, 
although advertising investments tend to materialize as increased sales sooner 
than investments in research and development.71  In their study of firms’ 
                                                                                                                 
explain the overall design and mechanics of trademark law and its benefits to consumers in the 
form of low search costs). 
 64. See Ong, supra note 9, at 229, 231 (noting the dependent relationship between 
consumers relying on trademarks for information and trademark holders relying on consumers for 
business development); see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 65. See Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and 
Fair Use, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, supra note 9, at 368, 372–74 (offering an example 
to illustrate the problems associated with trademark infringement). 
 66. COMING TO AMERICA (Eddie Murphy Productions & Paramount Pictures 1988). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 69. Miaoulis & D’Amato, supra note 45, at 48 (“Having a protected trademark encourages a 
company to maintain the quality of the product . . . linked to the mark, as well as to promote the 
image of the product through advertising and other marketing techniques.”). 
 70. See, e.g., J. Walter Elliott, Advertising and R&D Investments in the Wealth-Maximizing 
Firm, 35 J. ECON. & BUS. 389, 389–91 (1983) (explaining that creditors are more likely to issue 
loans for tangible assets like machinery or factories than for intangible assets like advertising, 
research, and development). 
 71. Id. at 390.  Depending on the product and the sector, a trademark may appear on 
materials associated with sponsorship of industry, sports and entertainment events, billboards, 
general and specialized print media, television, film, and points of sale including—and often most 
importantly—on packaging and labeling.  See, e.g., W.C. Howarth, Are Trademarks Necessary?, 
60 TRADEMARK REP. 228, 228–29 (1970) (describing the wide variety of places in which 
trademarks appear).  Advertising investments may represent a substantial part of trademark value.  
Dorothy Cohen, Trademark Strategy, 50 J. MARKETING 61, 61 (1986).  The Campbell Soup 
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decisions to make either type of investment, Professors Keith W. Chauvin and 
Mark Hirschey found that investments in quality are more likely “in industries 
such as industrial machinery and computing equipment, measuring 
instruments, photography, electronic equipment, and chemicals and allied 
products,”72 whereas toy companies, packaged-food manufacturers, tobacco 
firms, and leather-goods producers are more likely to invest in advertising.73  
In some industry sectors, such as soda and tobacco, a trademark’s value may 
comprise the majority of a company’s worth precisely because of indivisibility 
of advertising, promotion, and marketing costs from consumer preference for 
the trademark.74  These investments yield even greater gains in states with high 
rates of illiteracy because symbols or diagrams are more important in product 
selection than written words.75  Advocates of greater trademark protection 
argue that expanding trademark protections gives manufacturers more 
opportunities to benefit from prudent investments in advertising and quality 
and, correspondingly, lowers consumer information costs across a wider range 
of products and services.76 
                                                                                                                 
Company, for example, knows that “the average shopper views its red and white cans in 
supermarkets 76 times a year . . . making the well-known name and package equivalent” to 
millions in advertising dollars.  Id. (citations omitted); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 63, 
at 270 (“Creating such a reputation requires expenditures on product quality, service, advertising, 
and so on.”). 
 72. Keith W. Chauvin & Mark Hirschey, Advertising, R&D Expenditures and the Market 
Value of the Firm, 22 FIN. MGMT. 128, 130–31 (1993) (noting that nearly half of all industry 
groups conducted zero research-and-development activity). 
 73. Id. at 129. 
 74. See Shawn K. Baldwin, “To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”: A Role 
for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1707, 1704 
(1995) (“[T]rademarks may represent as much as eighty percent of a company’s value.”); Eran 
Kahana, Protecting Intellectual Capital in Startups: A Guide for the Entrepreneurial Attorney in 
the New Economy, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2002) (noting that intellectual 
property, such as trademarks, “frequently represents a substantial percentage of the company’s 
value”); see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 79–80 (1998) (discussing the success of  
Coca-Cola Co. at keeping its trademark associated with its product and avoiding “genericide”). 
 75. See Laura Heyman, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS L.J. 781, 
791 (2008) (noting the significance of trademarks as representative symbols that assist the 
illiterate in product identification); Surendra J. Patel, Trademarks and the Third World, 7 WORLD 
DEV. 653, 653 (1979) (noting that in 1974, nearly three-fourths of all trademarks were registered 
in developing countries and that more than four billion dollars was spent on promoting these 
trademarks in developing countries). 
 76. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Roots of 
Geographical Indicators, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2008) (observing that trademark 
law could “protect investments in quality and distinction . . . while also education the public about 
the goods themselves”); see also Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 
60 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 337–38 (1970) (discussing the importance and significance of 
trademarks). 
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For many areas of consumer products, expanding the property protections of 
trademarks generates benign or welfare-enhancing effects for consumers.77  
For example, consumers who know that a particular brand of work tools or 
cookware offers them the reasonable balance of quality and price spend less 
time comparing prices, searching for third-party evaluations, or, for ethically 
conscious consumers, investigating corporate production practices.78  
Trademark law justifiably acts to protect the expectations that consumers build 
into those brands from encroachment by competitors.79  Indeed, robust 
protections against counterfeiting and infringement exist partly for that 
reason.80  Internationally, ensuring stronger trademark protection lowers the 
costs for manufacturers to do business across national boundaries because their 
well-known brands facilitate entry into new markets.81 
B.  The Global Expansion of Trademark Protections 
Arguments favoring the expansion of trademark holders’ rights have 
persuaded legislators and regulators across the globe.82  In developed states, 
national laws place an increasing number of rights into the “bundle” enjoyed 
by trademark holders.83  In the United States, for example, the Lanham Act 
historically provided injunctive and monetary relief for firms able to 
                                                 
 77. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 275–80; see also Nicholas S. Economides, 
The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 527 (1988) (discussing consumer 
identification of “Nabisco Wheat Thins,” which identifies the product’s quality and its features to 
encourage purchase); Jeremy Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2011) 
(discussing the efficient transfer of information between producers and consumers through 
trademarks). 
 78. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text; see also Economides, supra note 77, at 
527 (emphasizing the variety of information transmitted to the consumer via trademarks). 
 79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Stephen Wilf, Who Authors 
Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (1999) (discussing the importance of 
protecting trademark identity). 
 80. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
827, 829–31 (2004). 
 81. Harold R. Weinburg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the Trouble 
with Traffix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–39 (2001) (“Trademark protection . . . may be 
advantageous for a producer seeking to introduce a new product into a limited area and ultimately 
expand into new products.”); see also Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for 
Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 461 (“Recent 
evidence indicates that product development and entry of new firms is limited by weak trademark 
protection in poor nations.”). 
 82. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 63, 68 (2009) (examining how “a significant conceptual shift” in trademark law has grown 
to protect non-competing, non-confusing uses); Robert Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of 
Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a 
Match Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 727–33 (1999) (reviewing laws and court 
decisions in Chile, Denmark, India, Jamaica, Mexico, and Vietnam, which have expanded 
trademark protections). 
 83. See Austin, supra note 80, at 830 (noting that trademark rights “continue to expand”). 
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demonstrate that a competitor’s mark created a “likelihood of confusion” as to 
the origin of trademarked goods or services.84  In 1995 and 2006, Congress 
strengthened protections for well-known marks through the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act and the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, which enabled 
trademark holders to enjoin activities that damaged certain trademarks even 
absent the “likelihood of confusion.”85  Under French law, trademarks have the 
same protections as copyrights and patents, and “the [trademark] proprietor 
must be entitled to enjoin any kind of unauthorized use, no matter for which 
purpose.”86  In 1979, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that 
trademarks constituted “property” under the Constitution, which elevated them 
to the same position as copyrights and patents.87  Because trademarks are an 
“expression of an entrepreneur’s achievement motivation,”88 German law now 
protects artists, holding companies, and advertising firms as trademark 
holders.89 
Moreover, developed states are pressing developing countries to follow suit 
through TRIPS and bilateral and multilateral treaties.90  Long frustrated at what 
                                                 
 84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see Austin, supra note 65, at 381 
(“The ‘ordinarily prudent consumer’ whom trademark law protects against the likelihood of 
confusion and against changes to mental impressions of famous brands, is not a real person.  She 
is both a legal construct and a conglomeration of judicial impressions. . . .”); Austin, supra note 
80, at 830–31. 
 85. See supra note 7; see also 141 CONG. REC. 38,559 (1995) (stating that under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act, “the use of DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos would be 
actionable”). 
 86. Annette Kur, Fundamental Concerns in the Harmonization of (European) Trademark 
Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, supra note 9, at 151, 151; see also Alain Michelet  
& Eric Le Bellour, 1 TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 58:12 (2011) (providing an 
overview of French trademark law); Kate Goldwasser, Comment, Knock it Off: An Analysis of 
Trademark Counterfeit Goods Regulation in the United States, France, and Belgium, 18 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207, 221–25 (2010) (comparing French courts’ strict application 
of domestic trademark laws to Belgian courts’ less stringent approach toward trademark laws in 
Belgium); Christian Derambure, The IP Guide to . . . France, NEWLEGAL REV. (Oct. 24, 2006), 
http://www.cpaglobal.com/newlegalreview/1175/the_ip_guide_to_france (explaining that French 
intellectual-property law mirrors the “likelihood of confusion” standard used in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, and also finds infringement “if the defendant reproduces the 
characteristic elements of the mark, or uses the mark in any commercial competition, which 
impacts the owner’s goodwill or reputation”). 
 87. Rudolf Rayle, The Trend Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners’ Rights—A 
Comparative Study of U.S. and German Trademark Law, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 235–36  
& n.40 (2000). 
 88. Id. at 236 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 270. 
 90. See generally, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36.  The U.S. Congress approved the 
establishment of the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement, and the rest of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on December 8, 1994.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).  Trademark protections are also enhanced through an extensive 
web of bilateral investment and trade treaties.   See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
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they viewed as insufficient protections for trademarks and trade names in 
developing countries, developed states introduced a set of uniform protections 
for trademarks at the 1986 Uruguay Round of negotiations for the WTO.91  
TRIPS, as those protections collectively came to be codified, grants trademark 
holders rights to prevent confusing uses of an identical or similar mark on 
identical or similar goods.92  TRIPS also allows trademark holders to sell and 
share their trademarks with greater ease than under some common law 
jurisdictions like the United States.93  Member states may pass protections 
greater than those detailed in TRIPS,94 but additional protections must be 
extended to nationals of other member states.95  In addition to substantive 
provisions, TRIPS also outlines minimal enforcement obligations of member 
states.96  Remedies include injunctions, money damages, and the use of border 
restrictions.97  In cases of willful counterfeiting, TRIPS requires criminal 
penalties.98  
                                                                                                                 
INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 5 (2007) (“A sizable proportion of these [investment] treaties 
include provisions obligating the contracting parties to meet [intellectual-property] standards that 
are more stringent than the ones found in the TRIPS Agreement.”); Ong, supra note 9, at 234–35 
(discussing difficulties in reaching an international consensus with trademark laws and the 
increasing reliance on bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which contain stricter  
intellectual-property provisions than those in TRIPS); see also Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient 
Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses 31 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 261, 263 (2011) (describing the abundance of bilateral investment 
treaties). 
 91. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36. 
 92. See id. at art. 16(1).  Owners of well-known marks receive additional protection against 
uses of their marks on dissimilar goods.  Id. at art. 16(2)–(3).  Article 20 limits the encumbrances 
that can be placed on trademarks.  Id. at art. 20.  According to Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Article 20 
did not contemplate restrictions on health, food, or security measures; rather, restrictions 
specifically related to a course of trade required, for example, that a foreign trademark be 
associated with a domestic licensee.  NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF 
TRADEMARKS AND DESIGNS § 20.16, at 331 (2006); see also Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 49, 
at 210 (“Such [justifiable Article 20] conditions might include an indication that the product has 
been manufactured by a licensee or a restriction of the use with certain products such as 
tobacco.”). 
 93. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 21 (allowing trademark holders “the 
right to assign [a] trademark with or without the transfer of the business to which the trademark 
belongs”), with Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “with Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time 
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 777–79 (2005) (discussing the historical requirement that 
trademark assignments include a business’s goodwill and the codification of this requirement in 
the Lanham Act). 
 94. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 1(1). 
 95. See id. at art. 3 (providing the caveat that this provision is subject to any Paris 
Convention exceptions).  The Lanham Act provides this protection to foreign nationals in the 
United States.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006). 
 96. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 41. 
 97. Id. at arts. 44–45, 57. 
 98. Id. at art. 61. 
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Although the WTO’s TRIPS Council compiles relevant intellectual-property 
laws from member states and provides opportunities for comment,99 a 
comprehensive and systematic evaluation of developing countries’ compliance 
with TRIPS is unavailable.  Notably, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative monitors trade barriers to U.S. companies through other 
countries’ intellectual-property laws and uses TRIPS as an important, but not 
exclusive benchmark.100  Based on somewhat limited data, it appears that many 
developing countries have brought their laws into compliance with TRIPS and 
that incentives exist for additional developing countries to continue this 
trend.101  Regional integration, trade treaties such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, 
and EU Council directives, as well as trademark-specific international treaties, 
also have increased trademark protections in participating states.102 
C.  Trademarks, Public Health, and Consumer Information Costs 
Regardless of national and international lawmakers’ motivations and 
rationales for adopting strong trademark protections, it is fair to say that they 
intended those protections to operate primarily against private conduct.103  For 
example, statutory schemes in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,104 the 
European Union,105 South Africa,106 Taiwan,107 the United States,108 and the 
                                                 
 99. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT  
& INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON  
TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 739, 748 (2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/ 
unctadictsd/docs/6.3TRIPS_COUNCIL_UPDATE.pdf. 
 100. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 3, 
8–9, 17, 20, 25, 31 (2009). 
 101. See Carsten Fink & Beata K. Smarzynska, Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and 
Developing Countries, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 403, 410 
(Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo & Philip English eds., 2002). 
 102. See NAFTA, supra note 36, at art. 1708 (outlining NAFTA’s trademark regime); 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, art. 1(2), Apr. 14, 1891, 
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]; 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6quinquies, Mar. 20, 1883, as 
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]; supra note 36. 
 103. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 369–70 (1999) 
(discussing the purposes of trademark protection and stating that such protection can create 
monopolies by giving individual producers complete product control in a given market, but can 
also satisfy the desires of consumers); see also Lynne Beresford, Geographical Indications: The 
Current Landscape, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 979, 980–81 (2007) 
(discussing trademark law’s purpose of protecting consumer expectations). 
 104. Protocol Amending the Benelux Uniform Law on Marks, Belg.-Lux.-Neth., art. 
13(A)(1)(c), Aug. 7, 1996, 2110 U.N.T.S. 258 [hereinafter Benelux Act]. 
 105. Markenrechtsreformgesetz [Trade Mark Reform Law], Oct. 25, 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBL] at 6, § 6 (Ger.). 
 106. Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 § 1(2)(xxiii) (S. Afr.). 
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United Kingdom,109 as well as Article 20 of TRIPS, specify protection of 
trademarks “in the course of trade” or “in commerce.”110  Many states’ statutes 
explicitly associate trademark protection with fair competition between 
sellers.111  France, for example, has extended criminal and civil liability for 
trademark infringement to third-party sellers.112  Although both domestic and 
international law define certain public interests to justify trademark 
legislation,113 scholarly authority largely supports the view that trademark 
protection exists to ensure fair competition between firms and accurate 
information to consumers.114   
Yet trademark holders are increasingly using trademark law not only against 
private acts of dilution or infringement, but also to thwart public-interest 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Andy Sun, From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan’s 
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 67, 101 & n.81 
(1998) (describing Taiwan’s trademark regulations within the context of TRIPS). 
 108. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see also Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion 
Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
474, 476 (2010) (describing how original trademark limitations are enabling moral rights to 
attribution present in many civil-law jurisdictions). 
 109. Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10 (Eng.) [hereinafter U.K. Trade Marks Act]. 
 110. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 20; see also McGrady, supra note 16, at 
60–61 (discussing the scope of TRIPS’ Article 20). 
 111. Bruce W. Slayden II, Recent Developments in Trademark Law, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 125, 133–35 (1995) (noting such explicit associations in Mexico’s and the United Kingdom’s 
statutes); see also Ley de Protección a la Propiedad Industrial [LPPI] [Industrial Property 
Protection Law], art. 90 § XVII, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 2 de Agosto de 1994 
(Mex.); CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 108–09 (2004) 
(discussing the shifting focus of trademark law from consumer confusion to dilution by other 
producers). 
 112. See Allison N. Ziegler, Comment, Online Auction House Liability for the Sale of 
Trademark Infringing Products, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 215, 229–30 (2010) (observing 
that under French tort law, online auction houses such as eBay may be liable for negligent 
conduct resulting in contributory trademark infringement); French Trademarks, INTELL. PROP. 
INFO., http://www.casalonga.com/French-Trademarks?&lang=en (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) 
(outlining the various penalties for trademark infringement and noting that criminal infringement 
may result in four years in jail). 
 113. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 8(1) (“Member[] [states] may adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development . . . .”); Paris 
Convention, supra note 102, at art. 6quinquies(B)(3) (providing that governments may refuse to 
register trademarks that are “contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a 
nature as to deceive the public.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental 
purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and 
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods.”); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER 
S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
559 (2000) (“[T]he fundamental principles of trademark law have essentially been ones of tort: 
the tort of misappropriation of the goodwill of the trademark owner, and the tort of deception of 
the consumer.”); supra Part I.A. 
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regulations intended to inform consumers about product risks and attributes.115  
In 1994, Canadian legislators considered imposing a “plain packaging” regime 
on cigarettes.116  This requirement provided that only the manufacturer’s name 
could appear in standardized black font, and that the remainder of the package 
must remain an entirely uniform color, except for government-mandated health 
warnings.117  A broad coalition of tobacco firms mounted a campaign to 
convince Canadian legislators that plain packaging would violate various 
intellectual-property norms, as well as trademark protections under NAFTA 
and other international agreements.118   
In 2001, tobacco companies organized similar campaigns against the 
prohibition of “light” and “mild” as product descriptors.119  Between 2008 and 
2010, Philip Morris International (PMI) challenged cigarette-pack labeling 
regulations imposed by Uruguay based on its recently adopted,  
TRIPS-compliant trademark law.120  The regulations require that pictorial 
warnings cover eighty percent of a cigarette pack’s surface and permit the sale 
of only one variety of cigarettes per brand under the so-called single 
presentation requirement.121  This part of the law prevents PMI from selling 
Marlboro “Reds,” Marlboro “Greens,” and Marlboro “Blues,” which leaves 
                                                 
 115. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 116. PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CAN., THE PLOT AGAINST PLAIN PACKAGING 3 
(2008), available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1’.pdf. 
 117. GARFIELD MAHOOD, WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANADA’S TOBACCO PACKAGE LABEL OR 
WARNING SYSTEM: “TELLING THE TRUTH” ABOUT TOBACCO PRODUCT RISKS 7 (2003). 
 118. See PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CAN., supra note 116, at 26. 
 119. Steven Chase, Tobacco Firm Warns “Mild” Cigarette Ban May Violate NAFTA, GLOBE 
& MAIL, Mar. 16, 2002, at 6, available at 2002 WLNR 12047568; Submission by Philip Morris 
Int’l, Inc., in Response to the Nat’l Ctr. for Standards and Certification Info., Foreign Trade 
Notification No. G/TBT/N/CAN/22, available at http://www.takingontobacco.org/ 
pmresponsetonoi.pdf. 
 120. See Raphael Lenucha, Philip Morris Versus Uruguay: Health Governance Challenged, 
376 LANCET 852, 852–53 (2010); Gustavo R. Fischer, Uruguay: The New Patent Legislation: An 
Overview, MONDAQ.COM (Dec. 18, 2000), http://www.mondaq.com/article 
.asp?articleid=9568 (stating that Uruguay acceded to TRIPS by law No. 16.671 on December 13, 
1994 and modified its Trademarks Act to conform to TRIPS and the Paris Convention).  The 
revised Uruguayan trademark laws, passed in 1998 and 1999, retain the essential features of the 
prior laws, but expand rights for property holders.  Id.  Uruguayan law allows trademark holders 
to challenge the registration of another mark that may confuse the public, but otherwise imposes 
criminal liability on violators, with punishments ranging from six months of imprisonment to 
three years of confinement in a penitentiary.  Establishing Provisions on Trademarks, Law. No. 
17.011, c. XIV, art. 83 (1998) (Uru.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id-
3946.  Authorities may seize and destroy infringing goods, except when they may be donated to a 
charity.  Id. at c. XIV, art. 84.  In addition, trademark holders may sue for damages and request 
judicial injunctions, which were unavailable under the pre-TRIPS law.  See id. at c.XIV, arts.  
87–88.  Indeed, Uruguay’s record for protecting foreign investment is strong.  Jonas Bergstein, 
Foreign Investment in Uruguay: A Law and Development Perspective, 20 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 359, 380 & n.104 (1989). 
 121. Uru., Ministry of Public Health Ordinance No. 514 (Feb. 14, 2009); Uru., Presidential 
Decree No. 287/009 (Dec. 2, 2009). 
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“Marlboros” as its only authorized variety.122  PMI claims that the regulations 
effectively expropriate its trademarks and has demanded compensation.123  In 
2011, PMI announced a virtually identical suit against the Australian 
government for its proposed plain-packaging regime.124   
Similar conflicts have arisen over food and alcohol regulation.  For example, 
when the Guatemalan legislature sought to prohibit images of infants on baby 
formula packaging—following guidelines adopted by the World Health 
Organization (WHO)—the Gerber baby-formula manufacturer argued that the 
prohibition amounted to an indirect expropriation of its valuable infant 
image.125  In January 2010, Thailand proposed legislation requiring that 
graphic warning labels cover thirty percent of the surface of beer, wine, and 
spirits containers.126  Subsequently, alcohol companies began organizing a 
worldwide effort to discourage the plan, partly based on the concern that the 
proposed restrictive labeling requirements could diminish their trademarks’ 
distinctive properties.127   
                                                 
 122. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Philip Morris Initiates Arbitration Against Uruguay over New 
Labeling Requirements, Taxes, INV. TREATY NEWS (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/05/11/philip-morris-initiates-arbitration-against-uruguay-over-new-
labeling-requirements-taxes/. 
 123. Philip Morris Makes Demands of Uruguay at the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, NETWORK FOR JUST. GLOBAL GOV’T (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://justinvestment.org/2010/04/phillip-morris-makes-demands-of-uruguay-at-the-international-
centre-for-settlement-of-investment-disputes/.  PMI eventually resorted to arbitration and claimed 
violations of a broadly worded investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.  See 
Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., art. 5, Apr. 22, 1991, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/26/2/00021341.pdf; FTR 
Holding S.A. v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. APRB/10/17, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 32 (Feb. 19, 
2011) [hereinafter Request for Arbitration], available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/ 
eng_home/2010/PMIvsUruguay/PMI-Uruguay%20complaint0001.pdf. 
 124. Bloomberg News, Philip Morris Sues Australia Over Cigarette Packaging, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2011, at B8. 
 125. Letter from Mario Permuth to Gustavo Hernandez, Ministry of Pub. Health (Feb. 16, 
1994) (on file with author) (“The Gerber Executive explained that they will fight with all their 
strength for the application and enforcement of their industrial property rights in Guatemala and, 
at this moment, the major damages affecting them derive from the fact that they have not been 
able to sell the [infant image-labeled] product in Guatemala.”). 
 126. Patrick Barta & Christina Passariello, Global Liquor Makers Fight Graphic Labels in 
Thailand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, at B1; see also Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Notification, G/TBT/N/THA/332, at 2 (Jan 21, 2010), available at http://docsonline 
.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/G/tbtn10/THA332.doc (alterting WTO members 
of proposed Thai regulations). 
 127. Barta & Passariello, supra note 126, at B1; Tobacco and Alcohol Technical Barriers 
Among Members’ Trade Concerns, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 24–25, 2010), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tbt_24mar10_e.htm. 
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In some of these cases, firms alleged a regulatory taking of private 
property.128  Furthermore, firms asserted that compensation should be based on 
their trademark’s value on the regulatory implementation date and take into 
account sales tied to the trademark and investments in trademark 
improvement.129  Trends in public-health regulation suggest that confrontations 
between states and trademark holders will become more frequent as states 
increasingly bear health-related costs for their populations’ consumption 
decisions.130  Indeed, in many economic sectors closely related to health, 
trademarks comprise a disproportionately large share of firms’ value.131 
1.  Alcohol 
Alcohol consumption, for example, not only results in greater harm to third 
parties relative to other drugs like cocaine and heroin,132 but also has 
substantial deleterious effects on users, such as increased risks of cancer and 
heart disease, and plays a causal role in traffic accidents, burns, poisonings, 
falls, and drownings.133  Additionally, alcohol consumption may facilitate risky 
                                                 
 128. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 37, at 133–34 (discussing tobacco companies’ claims 
that packaging regulations expropriate their trademarks and goodwill). 
 129. See Letter from Wayne W. Juchatz, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, & Sec’y, RJR 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., to the Standing Comm. on Health, House of Commons, Ottowa, Ont. 
(May 3, 1994) [hereinafter Juchatz Letter], available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mrm97c00 (calculating the value of RJR Nabisco, Inc. at eight 
billion dollars and asserting that “proper and full compensation in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars, would have to be paid” as a result of the expropriation of trademarks through  
plain-packaging regulations); Request for Arbitration, supra note 123, ¶¶ 93–94. 
 130. See Sam Foster Halabi, Participation and the Right to Health: Lessons from Indonesia, 
11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 49, 53–54 (2009) (arguing that health-system distribution should 
emphasize low-cost, high-impact public-health interventions); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance 
and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2008) (explaining the relationship 
between risk management and distributive healthcare decisions). 
 131. See Benjamin M. Arrow, Real-Life Protection for Fictional Trademarks, 21 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 111, 123 (2011) (“[T]he estimated value of Coca-Cola’s 
trademark . . . independent of any of its tangible assets is estimated to be approximately $24 
billion.” (citing Legislation Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws, 44 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 585, 586 (1992))); Juchatz Letter, supra note 129 
(“Trademarks are the most valuable assets of [tobacco manufacturers] Reynolds and 
McDonald.”). 
 132. David J. Nutt et. al., Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 376 THE 
LANCET 1558, 1560–61 (2010).  Alcohol consumption and its corresponding negative effects are 
increasing worldwide.  See Alcohol-Related Ills Increasing Worldwide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (June 25, 2009), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/brain-and-
behavior/articles/2009/06/25/alcohol-related-ills-increasing-worldwide; see also Charles D.H. 
Parry, Alcohol Problems in Developing Countries: Challenges for the New Millennium, 2 
SUCHTMEDIZIN IN FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS 216, 217–18 (2000), available at 
http://www.sahealthinfo.org/admodule/Suchtmed.pdf. 
 133. DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE 
DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 
D7-9-10, D7-12-13 (2010); WORLD HEALTH ORG., ALCOHOL AND INJURIES: EMERGENCY 
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sexual behavior.134  By proposing large graphic warnings on alcohol 
containers, the Thai government has indicated a reduced tolerance for “safe” 
levels of consumption and has now focused on preventing both low-risk and 
high-risk consumption.135 
Alcohol manufacturers’ dominant value is in their brands, which they use as 
a part of their broader advertising and marketing campaigns to appeal to 
consumers.136  Manufacturers and advertisers encourage consumption through 
sponsorship of sports and entertainment events, billboards, print media, and 
point-of-sale cues like packaging and labeling.137  The goal of these advertising 
efforts is for the brand to become the “real product” in the consumer’s mind.138   
Moreover, many alcohol trademarks appear to be designed to encourage 
children or adolescents to engage in early consumption.139  A study of 
Anheuser-Busch’s 1995 Budweiser advertising campaign, which featured 
croaking frogs, found that eighty-one percent of nine- to eleven-year-olds 
recognized the Budweiser frogs and that more children recalled the Budweiser 
slogan than slogans of other products advertised during the same viewing 
period.140  Additionally, alcohol manufacturers developed flavored alcoholic 
beverages like wine coolers—a cross between alcohol, fruit juices, flavorings, 
and soft drinks—to provide sweet, but low-alcohol options for entry-level 
                                                                                                                 
DEPARTMENT STUDIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, at iv (2009), available at 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/alcohol/en/. 
 134. Lori A.J. Scott-Shelden et al., Alcohol Consumption, Drug Use and Condom Use Among 
STD Clinic Patients, 70 J. STUDS. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 762, 762–63 (2009). 
 135. Barta & Passariello, supra note 126, at B1. 
 136. See, e.g., Sally Casswell, Alcohol Brands in Young Peoples’ Everyday Lives: New 
Developments in Marketing, 39 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 471, 471–72 (2004) (discussing how 
alcohol manufacturers use brand marketing to make their product part of consumers’ everyday 
life). 
 137. Id.; Sally Casswell & Anna Maxwell, Regulation of Alcohol Marketing: A Global View, 
26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 343, 343–44 (2005) (discussing advertising campaigns targeted at 
youths, which included cell phone use, e-mail, sports, and music). 
 138. NAOMI KLEIN, NO SPACE, NO CHOICE, NO JOBS, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE 
BRAND BULLIES 21 (2000); see also Judith A. Garretson & Scot Burton, Alcoholic Beverage 
Sales Promotion: An Initial Investigation of the Role of Warning Messages and Brand Characters 
Among Consumers over and Under the Legal Drinking Age, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 35, 
35–38 (1998) (discussing the effectiveness of alcohol promotion through brands). 
 139. See DIANE MCKENZIE, ASS’N TO REDUCE ALCOHOL IN ONT., UNDER THE INFLUENCE? 
THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOL ADVERTISING ON YOUTH 6–9 (2000), available at 
http://www.apolnet.ca/resources/pubs/rpt_AdImpactYouth.pdf. Budweiser, for example, 
trademarked a party-happy bull terrier featured in campaigns many viewed as targeting 
adolescents, children, and young adults.  Id. at 5–6. 
 140. Id. at 7; see also Alcohol Advertising Reaching Too Many Teens on Cable TV, 
Researchers Say, UCLA HEALTH SYS. (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.uclahealth.org/body.cfm 
?id=403&action=detail&ref=1264 (finding evidence to suggest that alcohol advertisements air 
more frequently during programming aimed at teens). 
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drinkers.141  Manufacturers purposefully shape the bottle design and images of 
flavored alcoholic beverages to mimic their spirits product lines.142 
2.  Packaged Food and Bottled Beverages 
Obesity levels are rising in both developed and developing countries and 
play a causal role in heart disease, diabetes, certain cancers, osteoarthritis, and 
strokes.143  The WHO partly attributes the emerging global obesity pandemic 
to processed fatty and sugary foods, which are heavily marketed to and 
consumed by children.144  To advertise these food and beverage products, 
manufacturers invest in visual elements like vivid graphics because these 
products are “low involvement”—that is, frequently purchased low-cost items 
that consumers select with little search-and-decision effort—and aspects like 
color and package size may facilitate repeat purchases because consumers 
quickly identify familiar color and shape schemes.145   
                                                 
 141. In the United States, for example, one study indicates that almost “one-third of youths 
begin drinking before age 13.”  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON 
GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND REDUCE UNDERAGE DRINKING 5–9 (2007) 
(citation omitted), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/underagedrinking/callto 
action.pdf; James F. Mosher & Diane Johnsson, Flavored Alcoholic Beverages: An International 
Marketing Campaign that Targets Youth, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 326, 326–27 (2005); see also 
AM. MED. ASS’N, GIRLIE DRINKS . . . WOMEN’S DISEASES (2004), available  
at http://www.alcoholpolicysolutions.net/alcoholpolicymd/press_room/girlie_drinks_release.htm 
(indicating that sweet malt liquor drinks attract teen girls, rather than adult women, largely as a 
result of marketing practices). 
 142. Mosher & Johnsson, supra note 141, at 328 (“According to a spokesperson for Diageo, 
the company that markets Smirnoff Ice: ‘It is no accident that the Smirnoff Ice bottle looks like 
the vodka bottle. . . . We’ve got it working on both ends (malt beverage and spirits).’” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Margaret C. Jackson et al., Marketing Alcohol to Young People: Implications 
for Industry Regulation and Research Policy, 95 ADDICTION S597, S600 (2000) (discussing the 
increasing trend of “flavoured alcoholic beverage[s]” targeted toward young people in the United 
Kingdom). 
 143. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: OBESITY AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF PREVENTION: FIT NOT FAT 15 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org 
/dataoecd/21/19/46004918.pdf.  Obesity also increases health expenditures in these counties.  Id. 
at 16; see also The Day of Diabetes: Coming Soon to a Person Near You, 376 LANCET  
1513, 1513 (2010), available at http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/ 
PIIS0140673610620120.pdf (“Obesity cost the Australian Government Aus$58.2 billion in 2008, 
according to Diabetes Australia, which comprised Aus$8.3 billion of financial costs and 
Aus$49.9 billion in lost wellbeing—due to disability or shorter life span.”). 
 144. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 916, DIET, NUTRITION 
AND THE PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASES 64–66 (2003), available at 
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/trs916/en/gsfao_obesity.pdf. 
 145. Pinya Silayoi & Mark Speece, Packaging and Purchase Decisions: An Exploratory 
Study on the Impact of Involvement Level and Time Pressure, 106 BRITISH FOOD J. 607, 610–12 
(2004); see also Aron M. Levin & Irwin P. Levin, Packaging of Healthy and Unhealthy Food 
Products for Children and Parents: The Relative Influence of Licensed Characters and Brand 
Names, 9 J. CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 393, 393–94 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley 
.com/doi/10.1002/cb.326/abstract (discussing an empirical study on the use of cartoon characters 
on packaging and the effects on children’s food preferences); David A. Marshall, Mark Stuart  
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Although regulators in developed and middle-income countries often require 
disclosure of nutritional information on food packaging, that information is 
generally provided in small print, obscured by trademarks, and fails to detail 
the product’s actual effect on consumers.146  Governments in Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom have found that front-of-package, graphic 
warnings more effectively communicate nutritional information to consumers 
than nutritional-information boxes.147  One Australian report concluded that 
“the most cost-effective interventions for obesity prevention were a 10% tax on 
junk food, restricting unhealthy food advertising to children, and the labeling 
of food packaging with a[n] [easier-to-understand] traffic-light system.”148  
The last of these options has prompted analogies to be drawn between cigarette 
labeling restrictions and those proposed for packaged food.149   
3.  Tobacco 
Tobacco consumption, which annually kills approximately five million 
people worldwide, represents the principal preventable threat to individual and 
public health in both developed and developing countries.150  Both users and 
                                                                                                                 
& Rick Bell, Examining the Relationship Between Product Package Colour and Product 
Selection in Preschoolers, 17 FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 615, 615 (2006) (noting the 
importance of color in food choice); Ike-Elechi Ogba & Rebecca Johnson, How Packaging 
Affects the Product Preferences of Children and the Buyer Behaviour of Their Parents in the 
Food Industry, 11 YOUNG CONSUMERS 77, 79–80 (2010) (noting the importance of packaging in 
children’s food preferences). 
 146. Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley, Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition 
Labelling: A Systematic Review, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 21, 21–22 (2005). 
 147. See CAROLYN L. ENGELHARD, ARTHUR GARSON, JR. & STAN DORN, REDUCING 
OBESITY: POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE TOBACCO WARS 34–35 (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411926_reducing_obesity.pdf. 
 148. The Day of Diabetes, supra note 143, at 1513.  The traffic-light warning system uses 
red, yellow, and green signs on food packaging to indicate the product’s level of sugar, salt, and 
fat.  Michael Skapinker, Europe Must Think Again on Food Labels, FT.COM (June 29, 2010, 
11:22 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b1e26bc-83af-11df-b6d5-00144feabdc0,s01=1.html 
(suggesting that the European Parliament erred by rejecting the application of traffic-light 
warnings on food packaging). 
 149. See IP in the Media, COMPLETE IP NEWS (Complete IP, Boronia, Victoria (Austl.)), 
Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 1–2, available at http://www.completeip.com.au/attachments/File/Issue 
_22.pdf (addressing the plain-packaging debate with regard to tobacco productions, but also 
observing that “fast food/junk food” is part of the “trend toward stripping trademarks from certain 
products, with a view that there is some benefit to removing them”); see also David A. Kessler  
& David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Effort to Preempt Failure-to-Warn 
Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 462–63, 467–68, 470–73 (2008) (discussing regulatory and tort-based 
regimes to incentivize accurate labeling in the context of prescription drugs). 
 150. THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW GLOBAL PUBLIC 
HEALTH 23 (2d ed. 2009); WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO 
EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE MPOWER PACKAGE 7 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/ 
tobacco/mpower/mpower_report_full_2008.pdf; see Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory 
Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 260–61 (1996). 
350 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:325 
non-users share the burden of disease from tobacco consumption.151  Although 
direct consumption of tobacco products causes various cancers, cardiovascular 
disease, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,152 second-hand smoke 
increases the risks of these diseases in nonsmokers as well.153  Tobacco 
manufacturers and their affiliated advertisers use strategies to frame the 
information on packaging, including the shape and size of the package itself.154  
Framing includes minimizing or obfuscating mandatory health warnings,155 
using descriptors like “mild,” “light,” and “ultra-light,” and shaping cigarette 
containers—for example, to mimic famous perfume packaging—to appeal to 
target populations.156  Cigarette manufacturers also use package colors and 
images to shape health perceptions.157  For example, “[r]efinements in the 
                                                 
 151. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 150, at 11, 15; see Lawrence O. Gostin, The 
“Tobacco Wars”—Global Litigation Strategies, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2537, 2537 (2007) 
(discussing litigation involving both smokers and those exposed to environmental tobacco smoke 
for compensatory damages stemming from tobacco-related illnesses and death). 
 152. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 150, at 9, 11. 
 153. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Burden of Disease and Best 
Practices: High-Level Roundtable on Tobacco Control and Development Policy (Feb. 3, 2003), 
available at http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2003/brussels/en/. 
 154. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 166 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics 
/sgr/2000/complete_report/pdfs/Chapter5.pdf (describing the various marketing tactics of tobacco 
companies that have prompted regulatory action); McGrady, supra note 16, at 57 (“[A]dolescents 
view those who would smoke cigarettes from a plain pack as being ‘wimpy, boring . . . [and] 
geeky’ compared with those who smoke from a branded pack as being ‘fun, popular, cool, with it 
[and] good looking.”); Joe B. Tye, Kenneth E. Warner & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Advertising 
and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 492, 494–95 
(1987) (emphasizing cigarette manufacturers’ interest in advertising and promotion to maintain 
brand loyalty). 
 155. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 154, at 169 (noting that 
Canadian tobacco companies circumvented broadly worded regulations, which resulted in 
warning labels that were less prominent than intended).  When PMI was trying to shape consumer 
perceptions of “light” and “ultra-light” cigarettes as healthier alternatives, it was also studying 
how to “overprint” mandatory Uruguayan warnings on cigarette packs.  Memorandum from Hugo 
Castro on Uruguay Warnings to Ramon Colon (Oct. 16, 1984), available at http://legacy 
.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpe28a00/pdf. 
 156. See AM. HEART ASS’N ET AL., DEADLY IN PINK: BIG TOBACCO STEPS UP ITS 
TARGETING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 1 (2009), available at http://www.tobacco 
freekids.org/content/what_we_do/industry_watch/deadly_in_pink/deadlyinpink_02182009_FINA
L.pdf (describing PMI’s deliberate marketing effort to make its cigarettes more appealing to 
women by using colors and packaging that resemble cosmetics); McGrady, supra note 16, at  
55–56 (discussing the regulatory measures intended to restrict the use of “light” and “mild” on 
cigarette packaging); see also Amir H. Khoury, Three Dimensional Objects as Marks: Does a 
“Dark Shadow” Loom over Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 335, 336–37 
(2008) (discussing examples of products that use container shape as functional equivalents of 
trademarks). 
 157. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENDER, WOMEN, AND THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC 106 
(2010), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241599511_eng.pdf (“The 
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[p]ackage consist[ing] mainly of increasing the amount of white space on the 
pack and lightening the brown color tones . . . [gave] the revised package the 
appearance of reduced strength.”158    
4.  Credence Claims and Manufacturing Processes 
Alcohol, processed food, and tobacco represent product categories 
associated with well-established, non-communicable disease burdens that 
governments have an interest in regulating.159  Yet the interest in regulating 
trademarks may not be limited to products or services with a direct and 
immediate relationship with human health.  Manufacturers may use trademarks 
to imply or suggest the existence of product attributes that are either difficult or 
impossible to verify.160 Logically, through these implications and suggestions, 
manufacturers raise consumers’ information costs.  
As a general matter, consumers spend time and money searching for 
reasonably priced goods and services.161  Both buyers and sellers engage in 
behavior aimed at reducing these costs.162  Buyers, for example, visit more 
than one seller to find a favorable price.163  Some goods lend themselves to 
relatively inexpensive searches because they may be easy to inspect before 
purchase.164  These “search” goods, like clothing,165 are characterized by ease 
of substitution and stiff price competition.166  Manufacturers’ trademarks are 
                                                                                                                 
attraction of a particular brand of cigarettes is affected by its name, logo, and package  
colors . . . .”). 
 158. E.C. ETZEL ET AL., CONSUMER RESEARCH PROPOSAL: CAMEL FILTER REVISED 
PACKAGING TEST STUDY 5 (1979), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qxb79d00.  For 
example, cigarette manufacturers first marketed menthol cigarettes as a remedy for a cold or flu, 
and the green color of menthol-flavored cigarette packs preserved the original association.  
Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence from Tobacco Industry 
Documents, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i73, i77 (Supp. I 2002). 
 159. See TULCHINSKY & VARVIKOVA, supra note 150, at 181–82 (discussing the health 
burdens associated with certain lifestyle habits, poor nutrition, and tobacco use); supra Part  
I.C.1–3.  “Non-communicable” disease, as used in this Article, tracks the relatively narrow view 
of a “communicable” disease now prevalent among public-health experts.  In a forthcoming 
article, I challenge this orthodoxy. 
 160. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 498–500; Ross D. Petty, FTC Advertising Regulation: 
Survivor or Casualty of the Reagan Revolution?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 23 (1992). 
 161. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214–15 
(1961) (arguing that consumers’ efforts to acquire information about the quality or performance 
of products and vendors depend on perceptions of expected benefits and costs). 
 162. Id. at 213 (“A buyer (or seller) who wishes to ascertain the most favorable price must 
canvass various sellers (or buyers) . . . .”). 
 163. Id. at 214. 
 164. Goldman, supra note 18, at 495. 
 165. Donald S. Siegal & Donald F. Vitaliano, An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 6 (Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., Working Paper No. 0602, 2006), 
available at http://www.economics.rpi.edu/workingpapers/rpi0602.pdf. 
 166. Petty, supra note 160, at 22–23. 
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less likely to frustrate consumers’ efforts to obtain relevant and accurate 
product information for search goods.167 
However, other goods have qualitative characteristics that buyers cannot 
ascertain before purchasing the item,168 because information about the 
product’s quality or performance is obtainable only through buying and using 
the good.169  For example, a consumer may have to purchase several brands of 
tuna fish to determine which brand she prefers.170  These “experience goods” 
include products like beer, packaged food, cigarettes, wine,171 and soda.172  For 
such goods, trademarks, especially those displayed at the point of sale, play a 
key role in earning and maintaining customers.173  Manufacturers invest in 
trademarks so that a consumer will associate a given product with its brand and 
spend less time searching for that good in the future.174  Once consumers find a 
satisfactory experience good, such as a favorite cereal, they generally will not 
expend their “scarce time and mental energies to identify alternative products 
that may prove marginally better or to incur the risk and uncertainty involved 
with switching.  Because of these costs and the uncertainties involved in 
switching, the information a trademark provides can ‘lock-in’ a consumer to 
products bearing that trademark.”175   
Consumers may not effectively evaluate certain other goods and services 
even after purchase and consumption.176  Assessing one’s satisfaction with 
these goods and services “requires additional costly information.”177  For 
                                                 
 167. Id.; see Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992) (“[L]ittle 
purpose could be served by falsely advertising about search qualities.”). 
 168. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 495 (indicating that products known as experience 
goods can only be evaluated after purchase); Petty, supra note 160, at 9 (stating that there is no 
cost-effective way to evaluate an experience good except through purchase). 
 169. Arthur S. Leahy, Search and Experience Goods: Evidence from the 1960’s and 70’s, 21 
J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 45, 45 (2005); Siegal & Vitaliano, supra note 165, at 6. 
 170. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J.  POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970). 
 171. See id. at 326 tbl.6. 
 172. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 103, at 425–27 (discussing Coca-Cola and Pepsi as 
examples for trademarks protecting and capturing consumer loyalty). 
 173. See id.; see also Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 
YALE L.J. 1323, 1344–45 (1980) (noting that point-of-sale advertising is a particular way of 
marketing experience goods). 
 174. See Lunney, supra note 103, at 428 (“[A]fter sufficient experience, a consumer’s 
association of a trademark with certain desirable features may become so ingrained as to pass 
below conscious thought . . . . Once the response reaches that level, a consumer may no longer 
stop to think about which brand she buys; her purchasing decisions will become merely a habit.”). 
 175. Id. at 427–28; see also Bo-Hyun Cho & Neal H. Hooker, The Cost of ‘Peace of Mind’: 
Signaling Food Safety 16 (St. Joseph’s Univ., Haub Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 11-6, 2011) 
(analyzing the importance consumers place on product labeling in the food-safety context). 
 176. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 
J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973). 
 177. Id. at 69. 
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example, in a given repair or replacement scenario, the consumer’s experience 
with the good will likely be the same both pre- and post-repair or 
replacement.178  Most consumers have “to rely on third-party judgments or on 
the seller’s credentials” to ascertain the good’s quality.179  Because it is so 
costly to verify the qualities of these “credence goods” or credence claims 
about search and experience goods, sellers may be encouraged to engage in 
deception or fraud.180   
Trademark holders can create credence qualities in products through design 
suggestion and implication, which allows manufacturers to circumvent 
prohibitions against deceptive representations.181  For example, in the case of 
cigarette manufacturers, selling a “mild” version of a cigarette creates a 
credence quality because some consumers may believe that smoking a “mild” 
cigarette constitutes a positive health measure,182 even though consumers have 
                                                 
 178. See id. (observing that most consumers are not familiar enough with these types of 
products to evaluate their effectiveness); see also Henry Schneider, Agency Problems and 
Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair 2–3 (Johnson Sch. of Mgmt., Cornell 
Univ., Research Paper No. 15-07, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cmf?abstract_id=1022204## (reporting that when a car was taken to forty garages, 
twenty-seven percent of garages suggested unnecessary repairs, whereas seventy-seven percent of 
garages missed real faults). 
 179. Esben Sloth Andersen & Kristian Philipsen, The Evolution of Credence Goods in 
Customer Markets: Exchanging ‘Pigs in Pokes’ 2 (rev. Jan. 10, 1998) (unpublished  
manuscript), available at http://www.business.aau.dk/evolution/esapapers/esa98/Credence.pdf.  
Nongovernmental monitoring groups may certify credence qualities by their compliance with 
certain products’ environmental, economic, and social factors.  See, e.g., Errol Meidinger,  
Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global Product Certification Programmes, in 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
TRANSACTIONS 259, 259 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter eds., 2008) (discussing 
participation by some timber producers in voluntary programs in which nongovernmental 
organizations monitor logging and certify compliance with sustainable practices). 
 180. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 496 (“Sellers seemingly have a great incentive to falsely 
advertise [credence] goods because purchasers will never learn of the deception.” (citing BeVier, 
supra note 167, at 13)); see also Sawbones, Cowboys and Cheats, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 2006, at 
78 (discussing situations in which customers may get overcharged for things they either did not 
need or did not get).  Under U.S. law, for example, the Food and Drug Administration regulates 
vitamin supplements as a specialized kind of “food.”  See Overview of Dietary Supplements, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/DietarySupplements/Consumer 
Information/ucm110417.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 181. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1318–19 (2011) (discussing firms’ methods to suggest 
or imply product qualities and observing that even truthful advertisements can be misleading); see 
also Mark Armstrong, Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 97, 106 (2008) (commenting on firms’ fine line between technical accuracy and 
“outright deception”). 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 476 (D.D.C. 
2006) (discussing consumers’ belief that “mild” cigarettes were better for their health); see also 
Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56 MD. L. REV. 384, 407 (1997) 
(pointing out that trademarks transmit certain product qualities to consumers that would otherwise 
be unknown until after purchase); McGrady, supra note 16, at 56 (“Internal tobacco industry 
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no means of verifying it.183  In this way, trademark holders may essentially 
enjoy benefits obtained by misrepresentation. 
The line between search goods, experience goods, and credence goods is not 
always clear.  A consumer may purchase a food product because it represents 
both search and experience qualities, such as taste, and because the consumer 
believes the food product is made in a manner consistent with ethical treatment 
of animals or workers—a credence quality.184  This latter quality is costly or 
impossible to verify.  For example, the clothing manufacturer and retailer 
American Apparel built its brand reputation on “sweat-shop free” labor 
practices, which implies that its competitors sell goods manufactured in poor 
labor conditions.185  The word “American” in its trademark subtly suggests 
comparative product information.186  States have an interest in protecting 
sources of accurate and relevant information, but traditional laws against 
deceptive trade practices may not cover these kinds of suggested product 
attributes.187   
As consumers increasingly demand stricter standards for the processes that 
create products, states will increasingly scrutinize trademarks and associated 
                                                                                                                 
documents show that tobacco companies have deliberately marketed products such as ‘light’ and 
‘mild’ type products to alleviate the health concerns of consumers.  Additionally, scientific 
studies demonstrate that the use of such terms fosters a perception amongst consumers that the 
products with which the terms area associated are less harmful to health than ‘regular’ tobacco 
products.”).  These descriptors are now prohibited in the United States.  See Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).  Indeed, 
exposing the myth of the “light” cigarette required years of expensive public-interest litigation in 
the United States.  See Office of Consumer Prot. Litig., Litigation Against Tobacco Companies, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 183. See In The Spotlight, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (Oct. 30, 2007), 
https://www.myhealth.va.gov/mhv-portal-web/anonymous.portal?_nfpb=true&_nfto=false&_pa-
geLabel=inTheSpotlightCurrent (observing that it may take years for smokers to verify the effects 
of tobacco use firsthand). 
 184. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 529 (2004) (describing how 
consumers are often motivated by “process information” credence qualities like social, 
environmental, or economic processes that are related to a product). 
 185. Stephanie Kang, American Apparel Seeks Growth Through an Unusual Deal, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 19, 2006, at B1, B6. 
 186. See PRACTITIONER’S TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.03(n) 
(James E. Hawes & Amanda V. Dwight eds., 7th ed. 2011) (regulating the use of “American” in 
trademarks); see also Louise Story, American Apparel Lands in Political Controversy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at C2 (stating that although American Apparel produces all of its clothing 
in Los Angeles, it has come under fire for hiring significant numbers of undocumented 
immigrants).  However, the “American” in the brand, according to American Apparel’s CEO, 
refers to the entirety of the Americas, not just the United States of America.  Id. 
 187. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
2012] International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health 355 
advertising for suggestive messages that, although deceptive, fall short of 
misrepresentations generally proscribed by law.188 
5.  Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Trademark Regulation 
Although scholars have addressed how misleading trademarks may survive 
review under consumer-protection statutes and regulations,189 there has been 
relatively modest research regarding how trademark regulation itself might 
better protect consumers.  There are two principal forms trademark regulation 
might take: ex ante, regulations through the trademark registration system, or 
ex post, regulations through a trademark monitoring-and-compensation 
system.190   
a.  Ex Ante 
Many jurisdictions inquire into whether a proposed trademark may mislead 
or deceive consumers before issuing a mark’s registration.191  For example, in 
the United Kingdom, regulators denied the trademark “Nugrape” because the 
beverage was not made from grapes.192  Yet those investigations are often 
narrow in scope and focus on the trademark application under consideration, 
not how the trademark may appear across product lines.193  Even reviewed in 
isolation, trademark examiners face high thresholds for determining that a 
trademark misleads or deceives consumers.194 
The trademark registration system may be altered to better protect 
consumers.  For example, legislators may require that examiners undergo more 
extensive training in consumer psychology to assess whether trademarks are 
deceptive or misleading,195 or examiners may be authorized to require 
                                                 
 188. See Kysar, supra note 184, at 531–32, 579–640 (suggesting growing consumer interest 
in how products are brought into market); supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra Part I.C.1–4. 
 190. See Sheff, supra note 77, at 1306 (discussing marketing regulations that “control the 
flow of information regarding products that are permitted in the marketplace” and that may be 
enforced ex post or ex ante); see also Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing 
Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products 37–38, 64–65 (St. Louis Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2011-31, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964025 (explaining the benefit of ex-post 
monitoring incentive systems in the medical-device context). 
 191. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006) (stating that deceptive trademarks 
may be refused registration). 
 192. McGrady, supra note 16, at 59. 
 193. See, e.g., PRACTITIONER’S TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra 
note 186, § 1209.04. 
 194. See id. (placing the burden of proof on the examining attorney to show that a 
trademark’s misdescription is material to a consumer’s election to buy the product). 
 195. See Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn Christensen, An Empirical and Consumer 
Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1036–39 (2009) 
(using consumer psychology models as a means to determining a trademark’s effect). 
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applicants to disclose surveys and other consumer-research data when 
registering their marks. 
Even with these enhancements, legal and practical limitations arise that 
impede the effectiveness of ex-ante regulations.  First, regardless of examiner 
competency or application enhancements, the process still pits overburdened 
regulators against parties that generally possess better information and 
resources to frame trademark applications.196  Second, application 
enhancements themselves may be challenged as barriers to trade under 
bilateral, regional, or multilateral trade agreements.197   
b.  Ex Post 
Ex-post solutions offer an alternative or complementary course for 
reconciling conflicting interests in trademark protection and consumer 
information costs.198  Ex-post solutions offer the benefit of observing a 
trademark’s functionality before tailoring a regulation based on the 
trademark’s effects on consumers in the market.199  This Article focuses on one 
particular ex-post approach: compensation for regulatory expropriation of 
trademark proprietors’ marks or trade names.200  In the limited number of 
relevant cases, trademark proprietors assert a broadly interpreted “fair market 
value” standard of compensation for regulatory takings.201  
II.  CONDEMNING TRADEMARKS 
This Article argues that the fair-market-value standard, as it is now 
articulated, unhinges trademarks from the social utility they are intended to 
promote.  The purpose of trademark protection is not to subsidize every dollar 
invested in product distinction or advertising; rather, trademark protections aim 
to provide a relatively modest incentive for manufacturers and service 
providers to invest in the competitive desirability of their products—that is, a 
trademark’s property interest is limited to the extent that a trademark actually 
causes consumers to prefer one product over another.202  When the state 
                                                 
 196. See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A 
Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 850–52 (2000) (discussing the 
increased amount of time between the filing and approval of trademark registrations at the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office). 
 197. See Ong, supra note 9, at 229–31 (noting that the purposes of such agreements are to 
encourage commerce between states by eliminating barriers to trade and that “inadequate 
protection of intellectual property rights may serve as a non-tariff barrier to free trade”). 
 198. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 199. See William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 
2287 (2010) (“The ultimate liability standard in trademark law certainly operates ex post—as an 
empirical examination of the way consumers actually perceived the mark . . . .”). 
 200. See infra Part II.B. 
 201. See supra note 129. 
 202. William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 199, 204–05 (1991) (discussing the source of a trademark’s value). 
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encumbers or “takes” a trademark by partially or totally prohibiting its use or 
by requiring additional product information (including warnings),203 it has 
concluded that some or all of the mark as it appears to consumers must be 
taken for a public purpose: to better inform consumers.204  As such, the 
trademark holder is not entitled to its investments in trademark quality or 
advertisements, but to only the narrow interest in distinguishing its product 
from others.205  In a condemnation proceeding for a trademark taking, a 
trademark holder therefore must demonstrate that the government regulation 
causes consumers to switch to competitors’ versions of similar goods or 
services.206 
Even if trademark holders successfully demonstrate this effect, the ultimate 
rationale behind trademark protection is still the reduction in consumer-search 
costs.207  Consequently, a regulating authority could introduce evidence of the 
disclosed information’s value and set that value against the value allocated to 
the trademark holder by virtue of the loss of product distinction.208  Based on 
these principles, each party has the evidentiary burden that they are best 
positioned to bear and each burden conforms to the underlying rationales of 
trademark protection.209  Additionally, this regime incentivizes firms to invest 
in product quality, as opposed to advertising, as the source of value in a 
trademark.210 
A.  Remedies for Competitors’ Violations of Trademark Rights 
Because regulatory takings claims for trademarks, at least of the type herein 
discussed, are relatively new, it is useful to address the aim of trademark 
protections in the context of private transactions.  As a preliminary matter, 
many states sensibly require trademark holders to police the use of their 
                                                 
 203. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (W.D. Ky. 
2010) (noting Congress’s purpose in requiring large warnings on cigarette packs); Joseph J. 
Lewczak & Angela M. Bozzuti, Will Federal Food Ad “Guidelines” Tread on Brand 
Trademarks?, 20 L. OPINION LETTER (Wash. L. Found., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 21, 2011, at  
1–2, available at http://wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/10-21-11LewczakBozzutti_ 
LegalOpinionLetter.pdf (discussing the negative impact on trademarks of regulatory guidelines 
dealing with nutritional content for food marketed to children). 
 204. See Roseann B. Termini, The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and 
Public Health, 81 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 147, 149 (2010) (describing the need to inform consumers of 
smoking’s ill effects as being the impetus for the first warning-label regulations). 
 205. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
625 (2004) (suggesting that courts should determine a trademark’s distinctiveness to establish the 
scope of protection it should receive). 
 206. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 207. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 492–93, 502 (1981); supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 210. Bone, supra note 4, at 555–56. 
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trademarks.211  Because trademarks ultimately grant the holder a monopoly 
over the use of a particular form of communication, trademark holders 
abandon the right to that monopoly when the trademark becomes synonymous 
with the underlying product:212  “aspirin” and “thermos” are examples of 
trademarks that the state may not protect because they have become generic 
and no longer meaningfully distinguish the product.213  
Trademark holders are also obligated to police their marks aggressively to 
show that consumers may be confused by similar marks and, in some cases, to 
prove damages like lost sales.214  For these reasons, trademark holders are best 
positioned to survey consumers about the relationship between trademarks and 
underlying products and to assert claims against parties that attempt to free 
ride.215  Indeed, many trademark holders have elaborate trademark policing 
systems in place to guard against infringement, as well as counterfeiting.216  
Assuming that the trademark holder effectively polices attempts to encroach 
upon the marks that distinguish its products, the holder may justifiably look to 
the state’s coercive power to prevent a rival from stealing its investments 
through infringement, mimicry, or injurious association.217   
When a private actor misappropriates a trademark holder’s mark or trade 
name through infringement or counterfeit, the infracting party essentially 
                                                 
 211. Katherine E. Gasparek, Comment, Applying the Fair Use Defense in Traditional 
Trademark Infringement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Linking Cases, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 787, 821–22 (1999) (“One solution is to continue imposing the burden of 
discovery on the trademark owner, because the owner is in the best position to monitor possible 
infringing uses of his trademark.”); Goldwasser, supra note 86, at 211 (discussing the burden on 
trademark holders to police Internet sites selling counterfeit goods); see also E. Brooke 
Brinkerhoff, Comment, International Protection of U.S. Trademarks: A Survey of Major 
International Treaties, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 109, 110 (2001) (discussing the 
complexities of policing marks in international markets). 
 212. Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 291. 
 213. Id. at 293.  Xerox famously fought to save its trademark through an extraordinarily 
expensive campaign.  See Sarah Randag, Xerox Enlisting Hollywood in Fight Against 
“Genericide” with Ad, ABAJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 11, 2010, 10:34 AM),  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/xerox_enlisting_hollywood_in_fight_against_genericide
_with_ad/ (describing Xerox’s ad campaign to avoid becoming a generic, non-protected term, 
such as “zipper”). 
 214. See Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of 
Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 451–52, 470–72 (2011). 
 215. See id. at 457–65 (discussing reasons to police heavily). 
 216. See, e.g., COOMBE, supra note 74, at 79–80 (outlining Coca-Cola’s trademark 
preservation strategy); see also Mireles, supra note 214, at 473 (noting the development of 
companies that provide trademark holders with monitoring services). 
 217. Fred S. McChesney, Deception, Trademark Infringement, and the Lanham Act: A 
Property-Rights Reconciliation, 78 VA. L. REV. 49, 54 (1992) (contending that “the law should 
seek the eradication” of trademark infringement); Mireles, supra note 214, at 461 (noting that 
courts are less likely to protect a trademark from third-party use when the holder inadequately 
policed its usage); see also Port, supra note 196, at 879–81 (outlining the justification for 
“dilution” causes of action). 
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forces the trademark holder into an involuntary sale or license of its 
property.218  In the case of counterfeit, the trademark holder may also lose the 
ability to control the quality of goods sold under its name.  The trademark 
holder is thus deprived of its ability to determine the price for which it might 
have transferred its property interest (if any), so the state intervenes to 
determine an objective value for the trademark holder’s interest.  That measure 
may be determined by statutorily established damages, 219 the lost sales 
attributable to the defendant’s conduct,220 imposition of a royalty similar to 
plaintiff’s royalty agreements with other licensees,221 or the profits derived 
from the sale of the infringing goods over an applicable claims period.222  
Article 45 of TRIPS, for example, ties damages to a level “adequate to 
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered.”223  With any of these 
aforementioned solutions, the state is able to gauge its interests in promoting 
trademark holders’ investments in their products, as well as consumer 
expectations, and then tailor remedies to further those interests.   
B.  Compensation to Trademark Holders for a Regulatory Taking 
In jurisdictions that require governments to compensate property owners for 
regulatory or eminent-domain takings,224 adjudicators are authorized to 
examine a wide range of information to calculate the award.225  In the United 
States, for example, adjudicators may ascertain the amount of compensation 
owed to the property owner through negotiation, expert testimony, analysis of 
comparable property sales, offsetting benefits to the owner, and third-party 
                                                 
 218. See McChesney, supra note 217, at 54 (“Trademark infringement, however, is 
essentially theft.”). 
 219. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing that in lieu of 
actual damages, a plaintiff may opt for statutory damages within a prescribed range). 
 220. See BeVier, supra note 167, at 19–20; McChesney, supra note 217, at 51–53 (discussing 
data regarding lost sales). 
 221. Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 4279812, 
at *12 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008) (“A reasonable royalty . . . can be a measure of actual damages in a 
trademark infringement case.” (citing Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 
1350 (7th Cir. 1994); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274–75 
(9th Cir. 1983))). 
 222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing for recovery of defendant’s profits for trademark 
violations); see also Coach, Inc. v. Asia Pac. Trading Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922–25 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (stating that Lanham Act recovery “is limited to an accounting period beginning after 
the defendant receive[s] actual notice of the plaintiff’s [trademark] registration”). 
 223. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 45. 
 224. See David Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes 
to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 499, 529–30 (1996) (discussing the “regulatory” taking 
doctrine as idiosyncratically American, although other jurisdictions have crafted analogous legal 
doctrines); see also Been & Beauvais, supra note 37, at 58–59 (describing the United States’s 
compensation requirement for “takings” as “among [one of] the most protective in the world”). 
 225. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005). 
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appraisal, among other methods.226  In France, special administrative courts 
may value taken property through “comparable sales, income or capitalization 
methods, replacement cost, attorney’s fees, and benefits offset.”227  In Canada, 
private-property owners may be compensated for the market value of the 
expropriated property, injurious effect to the remainder of the property, 
disturbance damages, and business loss.228   
Similarly, arbitration and dispute-settlement panels adjudicate expropriation 
disputes under NAFTA, bilateral investment and trade treaties, and other 
multilateral and regional instruments.229  These panels enjoy wide authority to 
admit or reject documents supporting or refuting claims, call witnesses, or 
consider other evidence relating to a claim’s value.230  This Article’s 
framework is principally aimed at international forums that are still in the 
process of forming appropriate approaches to investment disputes.231  It may, 
however, provide a useful model for national jurisdictions that struggle to craft 
optimal takings regimes.232  One U.S. review of takings jurisprudence noted 
                                                 
 226. See id. at 683 (citing United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 
U.S. 396 (1949)); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 725–29 (1993) (discussing courts’ use of market value for guiding 
compensation judgment); Real Estate Acquisition Guide for Local Public Agencies, FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/lpaguide/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 
2011) (describing the real-property condemnation process for eminent-domain actions and 
emphasizing negotiation and consultation with expert appraisers in resolving a government 
takings dispute over property value). 
 227. Erin Darling, Liz Skillen & Minming Wu, Just Compensation Valuation Schemes After 
a Flood Disaster in France, California, and Louisiana 30 (April 28, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters/Darling_Skillen_Wu.pdf. 
 228. Denstedt & Rodier, supra note 29, at 355. 
 229. See Gustavo Carvajal Isunza & Fernando González Rojas, Evidentiary Issues in NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Arbitration: Inquiring the Truth Between States and Investors Under NAFTA Chapter 
11, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 121, 121–22, 124 (2003) (discussing the nature of 
NAFTA and the United Nations Commission on International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)); see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent 
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1522–23 (2005) (discussing BITs and the significance of 
broad networks with interrelated rights); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs 
Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 86–87 (2005) (discussing the function of BITs and how most BITs with 
developing countries adopt the “western view” of international law regarding regulatory takings). 
 230. See Isunza & Rojas, supra note 229, at 135–36; see also International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute [ICSID], ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, at art. 43, 
ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules], available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp (“[T]he Tribunal may, if it deems it 
necessary at any stage of the proceedings, . . . call upon the parties to produce documents or other 
evidence . . . .”). 
 231. Franck, supra note 229, at 1523 (observing that “investment arbitration is still in its 
infancy”). 
 232. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, at art. 1110 (noting that NAFTA arbitration panels 
enjoy significant discretion under the treaty’s standard for compensation for indirect 
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that “the [Supreme] Court’s present interpretation of ‘regulatory takings’ sits 
upon a shaky foundation of split decisions; the Court’s construction of 
‘constitutional property’ remains a work in progress.”233  Indeed, in the United 
States, where trademark holders have historically favored characterizing their 
marks as speech for First Amendment protections, there are hints of more 
aggressive use of expropriation principles.234  When the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) released its proposed pictorial and graphic warnings for 
cigarette packaging, one tobacco firm asserted that “by confiscating” part of 
the cigarette pack, the labels would violate its First and Fifth Amendment 
Rights.235 
Typically, trademark holders assert that when state regulations—like large 
warnings or prohibitions on certain aspects of trademarks—“take” their 
trademarks, they are entitled to compensation for the fair market value of 
                                                                                                                 
expropriations, which is “equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriation took place . . . . Valuation criteria shall include going 
concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value” (emphasis added)).  NAFTA’s compensation 
standard has prompted disagreement between industrialized and third-world states.  See Salacuse 
& Sullivan, supra note 229, at 86–87 (“Despite opposition by some developing nations in various 
multilateral forums, virtually all BITs with developing countries adopt some variation of the 
traditional Western view of international law that a state may not expropriate property of an alien 
except: (1) for a public purpose, (2) in a non-discriminatory manner, (3) upon payment of just 
compensation, and in most instances, (4) with provision for some form of judicial review.  The 
various elements of the traditional rule have taken different formulations in different treaties, 
some more and some less protective of investor interests.” (emphasis added)); Timothy Ross 
Wilson, Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter 11) Part II: Are Fears 
Founded?, 6 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 205, 210 (2000).  Moreover, neither scholars, 
arbitration panels, nor governments have been able to reach any predictable standard for the 
threshold over which a regulatory measure constitutes an indirect expropriation, much less what 
the right standard for compensation should be if that threshold is passed.  See Christopher Gibson, 
A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 
25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 384 n.96 (2010); see also Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA 
Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 318 (1994) (noting third-world countries’ opposition to a  
fair-market-value standard because they prefer an ‘appropriate’ compensation standard based on 
the “circumstances giving rise to the expropriation”). 
 233. Garrett Power, Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a Constitutional 
Concept, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 221, 223 (2009); see also Marla E. Mansfield, Tahoe-Sierra Returns 
Penn Central to the Center Track, 38 TULSA L. REV. 263, 263 (2002) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s inability to describe regulatory takings “crisply”). 
 234. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539 (W.D. Ky. 
2010) (“Finally, Plaintiffs [tobacco firms] contend that the [Tobacco Control] Act’s mandated 
warning requirement ‘deprives [them] of their trademarks, trade dress, packaging, and advertising 
without just compensation,’ and is ‘no different than if the Government confiscated half of every 
billboard for a message on any other issue of public policy.’” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted)); Young, supra note 20. 
 235. Young, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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trademarks.236  Contesting Australia’s abandoned 1992 effort to require 
tobacco manufacturers to sell cigarettes in plain packaging, British American 
Tobacco argued before the Australian Senate that the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property and Australian law would require 
compensation for the value of its cigarette brands.237  Persuaded by the tobacco 
industry, the Australian government rejected the proposed regulations.238  The 
Ministry of Health announced that “[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not 
feasible . . . . We would have to buy the tobacco companies’ trademarks, and 
that would cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.”239  
In 1994, Philip Morris and RJR Reynolds engaged former U.S. and 
Canadian trade negotiators to persuade Canadian legislators that the “unlawful 
expropriation” of their trademarks under plain packaging would amount to 
hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation under a NAFTA Chapter 11 
proceeding.240  In its claim against Uruguay for its packaging regulations, PMI 
asserted a similar argument.241  Indeed, PMI argues that it is entitled to 
compensation, or “restitution,” in the amount of a fifteen percent decrease in 
sales experienced after regulatory implementation.242  In his review of 
                                                 
 236. See Serkin, supra note 225, at 678 (“For all the disagreement and uncertainty in the rest 
of takings jurisprudence, compensation is considered straightforward; it is measured by the fair 
market value of the property taken.”); Supplementary Submission from W.D. & H.O. Wills 
(Aust.) Ltd. to Senate Cmty. Affairs References Comm., Generic Packaging: Inquiry into 
Tobacco Industry and the Costs of Tobacco-Related Illness 4 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Generic 
Packaging, Supplementary Submission to Senate Comm.], available at http://legacy.library.ucsf 
.edu/tid/qnd14a99/pdf?search=%22generic%20packaging%20supplementary%20submission%20t
o@20senate%22  (arguing that the proposals would lead to substantial claims for compensation). 
 237. See Generic Packaging, Supplementary Submission to Senate Comm., supra note 236, 
at 3; Submission to the Industry Inquiry from W.D. & H.O. Wills (Aust.) Ltd., The Tobacco 
Growing and Manufacturing Industries 32 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Tobacco Growing and 
Manufacturing Industries’ Submission to Industry Commission], available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kpk33a99/pdf (noting that the proposed packaging regulations 
“amount to a severe infringement of internationally-registered intellectual property rights”). 
 238. See Adam Harvey, Doctors’ Plan to Put Cigarettes in Plan Wrap Fails, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, July 24, 1995, at 2 (quoting the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Health as 
stating that “[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible . . . . We would have to buy the 
tobacco companies’ trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds of millions of dollars”). 
 239. See id. at 2. 
 240. See Juchatz Letter, supra note 129 (contending that a regulatory taking necessitated 
“proper and full compensation”). 
 241. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 242. Request for Arbitration, supra note 123, ¶¶ 45, 89 (“As of 31 December 2009, Article 3 
of Ordinance 514 has resulted in an approximately 15 per cent decrease in Abal’s sales.  The 
hardest hit brand has been ‘Marlboro,’ of which the discontinued ‘Marlboro Gold,’ ‘Marlboro 
Blue’ and ‘Marlboro Green (Fresh Mint)’ varieties represent 40.5 per cent of total sales in  
2008. . . . It should be noted that Philip Morris affiliates worldwide have invested significant 
amounts of time and money in developing a revision of the three sub-brands of the Marlboro 
family.  As a result of Ordinance 514, Philip Morris has been prevented from introducing these 
innovations in Uruguay and accordingly has been deprived of the use of its intellectual 
property.”). 
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compensable claims under NAFTA, Professor Alberto Salazar suggests that 
food packaging restrictions and warnings may result in compensation claims 
based on expropriation of package space and content because they limit “food 
corporations’ ability to profit from the use of their physical and intellectual 
property rights.”243  In his analysis of alcohol manufacturers’ participation in 
trade and investment treaties, Dr. Donald Zeigler observes parallels between 
the tobacco companies’ property claims and those alcohol manufacturers 
advocate in trade and investment instruments.244 
Advocates and scholars contesting trademark holders’ claims focus on 
human rights, public health, and even textual reasons to justify expansive 
public-interest regulations.245  In the context of tobacco control, scholars and 
advocates invoke the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control246 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to 
justify strong laws limiting the use of tobacco trademarks.247  According to 
                                                 
 243. Salazar, supra note 43, at 51. 
 244. Donald W. Zeigler, The Alcohol Industry and Trade Agreements: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 104 ADDICTION 13, 20–21 (2009). 
 245. See, e.g., Oscar A. Cabrera & Alejandro Madrazo, Human Rights as a Tool for Tobacco 
Control in Latin America, 52 SALUD PÚBLICA DE MÉXICO S288, S289–91 (2010) (referring to 
international treaties and a government’s obligation to advance public health and human rights as 
a basis for enacting tobacco-control regulations); Carolyn Dresler & Stephen Marks, The 
Emerging Human Right to Tobacco Control, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 599, 599 (2006) (advocating for 
health regulations based on human rights). 
 246. See TODD WEILER, PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CAN., PHILIP MORRIS V. 
URUGUAY: AN ANALYSIS OF TOBACCO CONTROL MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 4 (2010), available at http://www.smoke-
free.ca/eng_home/2010/PMIvsUruguay/Opinion-PMI-Uruguay.pdf (noting Uruguay’s increased 
tobacco regulation following its ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC)).  The FCTC’s implementing guidelines recommend that graphic warnings cover fifty 
percent or more of a cigarette package.  See WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO 
CONTROL, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 53 (2011), available at http://apps.who.int/fctc 
/reporting/database. 
 247. See Cabrera & Madrazo, supra note 245, at S292 (“For the purposes of linking human 
rights and tobacco control, one of the most relevant treaties is the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights . . . .”).  Article 12 of The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) ensures “the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”  International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  Moreover, “the 
right to health, like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: 
the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil [sic]. . . . The obligation to protect requires States to 
take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with article 12 guarantees.”  U.N. Econ. 
& Social Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).  The General Comment further states that “violations of the right 
to health can occur through the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by 
States.”  Id. ¶ 48.  In addition, 
Violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure of a State to take all 
necessary measures to safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of 
the right to health by third parties.  This category includes such omissions as . . . the 
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these scholars, because human rights are inviolable, a trademark holder’s 
property interest is necessarily subordinate in the case of a conflict.248  For 
example, Professor G.C. Christie argues that if a prohibition concerning the 
use of property “can be justified as being reasonably necessary to the 
performance by a State of its recognized obligations to protect the public 
health, safety, morals or welfare, then it would normally seem that there has 
been no ‘taking’ of property.”249  Yet prominent international lawyers dispute 
that view,250 and international adjudicators have demonstrated little 
predictability when balancing investment or takings claims with international 
human-rights instruments.251 
At the very least, they argue that an investor’s expectations should be 
tempered by knowledge that a state’s various treaty obligations, including 
human-rights or public-health provisions, will be construed in a manner to 
avoid conflicts.252  However, the language of multilateral and human-rights 
treaties tends to impose few concrete obligations.253  Moreover, the 
unpredictability of arbitration and judicial decisions on the appropriate extent 
of regulation without compensation254 suggests that scholars, judges, and 
regulators should consider the appropriate way to compensate trademark 
holders if normative debates fail to give adequate guidance.   
C.  Trademark Holders’ Burden to Show Consumer Switching 
Using fair market value as a compensation standard for regulatory takings of 
trademarks could unhinge trademark protection from the intended  
                                                                                                                 
failure to discourage production, marketing and consumption of tobacco, narcotics and 
other harmful substances . . . . 
Id. ¶ 51. 
 248. Cf. Vadi, supra note 49, at 795 (pointing out that “‘property is not an end in  
itself . . . . [I]t must . . . contribute[] to the higher objective of human society’” (quoting Jakob 
Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Conflict or Convergence?, 7 J. WORLD. 
INTELL. PROP. 143 (2004))). 
 249. Schneiderman, supra note 224, at 530 n.168. 
 250. Id. (citing Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments 
in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 330-31 (1982) (“Is the distinction 
intellectually viable? Is not the State in both cases . . . purporting to act in the public good? And 
in each case has the owner of property not suffered a loss? Under international law standards, a 
regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and effect) to a taking, would not be ‘for a public 
purpose’ (in the sense of in the general, rather than for a private, interest). And just compensation 
would be due.”)). 
 251. Franck, supra note 229, at 1523. 
 252. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that treaties shall be interpreted to take international laws into account). 
 253. See Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 125–28 (2010). 
 254. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 37, at 107–08 (noting the unequal treatment by 
arbitration panels comprised of investors). 
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welfare-enhancing function of trademarks.255  Trademarks, unlike copyrights 
and patents, are not protected because lawmakers desire to reward trademark 
creation in a vacuum; rather, trademark protection is tied to investments in 
product distinction and the reduction of consumer search costs.256  As a matter 
of definition, trademarks are protected only to the extent that they effectively 
distinguish their products.257   
When a state determines that a trademark must either be restricted or its 
visual display affected, such as a warning, the state is exercising a “taking” 
only to the extent that the basis for the trademark—the ability to distinguish 
between goods and services—is diminished.258  Although the state might be 
obligated to show the taking’s extent, for the reasons articulated below, 
trademark holders are better positioned to bear this initial evidentiary 
burden.259  Accordingly, trademark holders should be entitled to compensation 
only to the extent they are able to make such a showing.260  A regulating 
authority, of course, may rebut that initial showing by establishing, for 
example, that consumers are not switching to competitors’ goods or services, 
but rather decreasing or ceasing consumption.261 
                                                 
 255. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 4, 76 and accompanying text.  By contrast, copyrights protect an 
author’s original works and patents protect an inventor’s particular inventions.  U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS 1–2 (2011), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.pdf (“Trademark rights 
may be used to prevent others from using a confusingly similar mark, but not to prevent others 
from making the same goods or from selling the same goods . . . under a clearly different mark.”); 
see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 114, at 559 (“[T]rademark protection is 
awarded merely to those who were first to use a distinctive mark in commerce.”). 
 257. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.  In the United States, for example, a 
trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).  Under 
TRIPS, “[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services 
of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a 
trademark.”  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 15(1) (emphasis added).  In Uruguay, a 
trademark is “any sign capable of distinguishing goods and services of one natural or legal 
person from those of other natural or legal persons.”  Law No. 17.011, Sept. 25, 1998, Díctanse 
Normas Relativas a las Marcas [Establishing Provisions on Trademarks] (Uru.), translated in 
WIPO Resources, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id 
=130087 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 211, 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 260. See infra Part II.C.1–5. 
 261. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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1.  The Property Interest in Trademarks Is the Extent to Which the State 
Protects Them  
As the aforementioned examples show, lawmakers extend protections to 
trademark holders in order to distinguish their goods or services.262  The extent 
to which trademarks are valuable is precisely the extent to which the state 
decides to protect them.  The state, as the provider of the trademark 
entitlement,263 has the authority to attach whatever limits are necessary to 
maintain the fundamental interest in consumer search costs, including a 
requirement that trademark holders show a public-interest regulation’s effect 
on a consumer’s distinction between products.264  Before modern trademark 
protections emerged, Felix Cohen observed that a trademark’s value is entirely 
dependent on the state’s willingness to determine that investments in quality or 
advertising qualify as property: 
There was once a theory that the law of trade marks and tradenames 
was an attempt to protect the consumer against the “passing off” of 
inferior goods under misleading labels.  Increasingly the courts have 
departed from any such theory and have come to view this branch of 
law as a protection of property rights in divers[e] economically 
valuable sale devices . . . . The current legal arguments runs: One 
who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his product 
has induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol, 
form of packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value, a thing 
of value is property; the creator of property is entitled to protection 
against third parties who seek to deprive him of his  
property. . . . The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain.  It 
purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a 
matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends 
upon the extent to which it will be legally protected.265 
A similar argument might apply to other intellectual properties like 
copyrights and patents.266  The theoretical reason to grant creators temporary 
                                                 
 262. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 264. See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940) (“We are 
nearly sure to go astray . . . as soon as we lose sight of the underlying principle that the wrong 
involved is diverting trade . . . .”). 
 265. Cohen, supra note 43, at 815 (footnote omitted).  In 1999, Mark Lemley criticized the 
trend of federal courts giving expansive protections to trademarks as “things” and allowing 
trademark holders to sell or transfer trademarks divorced from their underlying products.  See 
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1687–88.  He urged courts to restore commonsense to American 
trademark law by focusing on the incentives trademark protections create and the ways in which 
infringing or diluting behavior actually injures consumers.  Id. at 1688. 
 266. William Sloan Coats & Jennifer L. Co, Location, Location, Location: The Impact of 
Omega v. Costco on the Applicability of the First Sale Doctrine in the Grey Market, 1063 
PLI/PAT 407, 411 (2011) (“Exclusive rights granted to copyright, trademark, and patent owners 
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monopolies over their creations is to provide an incentive for additional 
creative or inventive works that may benefit society.267 As an empirical matter, 
this theoretical premise has always been difficult to answer: if there were no 
copyright or patent protection, would creators still invent?268  If so, would they 
invent less?  Indeed, in some jurisdictions, substantive property rights originate 
with the state.269  Therefore, even real property might be subject to whatever 
conditions the state deems appropriate for its ownership and management.270   
2.  Trademark Holders Already Aggressively Monitor Relevant Markets and 
Trademarks 
Trademark holders are best positioned to monitor a regulation’s effect on 
market share because many trademark holders—especially those that make 
significant investments in the advertising component of trademark  
value—already maintain elaborate policing systems to protect against private 
encroachment as well as regulation.271  As a result, requiring holders to adduce 
evidence as to the competitive effect of regulations adds only marginal costs to 
existing monitoring systems and structures.  Tobacco firms, for example, long 
ago adopted worldwide trademark registration, policing, and exploitation 
programs.272  In 1995, British American Tobacco established an entirely 
separate entity, BATMark, designed to 
protect the [global] trade marks and other intellectual property assets 
of the British American Tobacco group and to facilitate their 
exploitation.  Lawyers and Trade Mark Managers advise and handle 
all trade mark and copyright matters, including anti-counterfeiting 
                                                                                                                 
are limited in order to maintain a balance between the interests of rights owners and economic 
and/or public interest concerns.”). 
 267. See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later 
Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 56 (2009) (describing the need to maintain incentives for new 
creations in the context of patent law). 
 268. See Eugene C. Lim, Dilution, the Section 22 Debacle, and the Protection of Business 
Goodwill in Canada: Some Insights from U.S. Trademark Law and Policy, 101 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1232, 1268 (2011) (articulating the incentive rationale underlying patent and copyright 
protection); see also Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 506 (2009) (describing how inability to obtain patents thwarts drug 
development).  But see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 11 (2008) (arguing that intellectual-property protections do not motivate the 
development of new innovations or increase creativity). 
 269. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Lunney, supra 226, at 724 (noting one view that regards societal goals as superior to 
the government’s need to compensate for takings). 
 271. See infra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 272. See generally, e.g., Memorandum by British American Tobacco, Strategic  
Management of Trade Marks and Other Intellectual Property (undated), available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/riq34a99 (outlining the tobacco company’s efforts to monitor 
and protect its trademark). 
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the drafting of licences [sic] and other commercial  
agreements . . . .273   
A single monthly trademark-monitoring report from 1999 showed that Philip 
Morris’s parent corporation contested trademark registrations or other actions 
relating to its food, alcohol, and tobacco brands in Argentina, Ecuador, the 
European Union, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Peru, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and closely monitored actions in Bolivia, Croatia, the 
Dominican Republic, and Indonesia.274  These systems are part of a larger 
strategy to monitor “mature” product markets—that is, markets in which 
consumption levels are relatively stable so a small number of players vie for 
the segment of the consuming public willing to switch.275  Trademark holders, 
especially of trademarks that represent significant advertising investments, are 
served by global consultancies that report the (admittedly subjective) value of 
trademarks as a function of competitors’ market share.276  Regular quantitative 
and survey-based research into consumer preferences often accompanies 
trademark monitoring.277  Similar infrastructure exists for alcohol and 
packaged-food brands.278   
Manufacturers and their trademark developers excel in gathering 
information as to what causes consumers to prefer one brand, image, or logo 
over another.279  Given the regularity with which many trademark holders 
submit survey evidence against private infringers or even trademark 
                                                 
 273. BRITISH AM. TOBACCO, EFFECTIVE TRADE MARK MANAGEMENT 29-06 (1998), 
available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rcn93a99/pdf. 
 274. Memorandum from Robert J. Eck on September Trademark Activities to J. Bongerter et 
al., Philip Morris Mgmt. Corp. (Oct. 11, 1999), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf 
.edu/tid/rhm62c00/pdf. 
 275. See Jennifer A. Lesny, Note, Tobacco Proves Addictive: The European Community’s 
Stalled Proposal to Ban Tobacco Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 149, 164–65 (1993) 
(“In a mature market products are firmly established, widely distributed, easily recognized by 
consumers, and available for a relatively low price . . . . Advertising for mature products . . . is 
directed at building brand loyalties and luring consumers away from competing products.”). 
 276. See Alexander Ourusoff, What’s in a Name? (Brand Name Valuation), FIN. WORLD,  
1–4 (1992), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xkd42d00/pdf. 
 277. See, e.g., LANDOR ASSOC., THE MARLBORO TRADEMARK ESSENCE PROGRAM 1–4 
(1993), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ofg89a00/pdf (outlining a plan to strengthen 
Marlboro’s trademark using consumer data and research). 
 278. See, e.g., KRAFT GEN. FOODS INT’L, KRAFT GENERAL FOODS INTERNATIONAL: FIVE 
YEAR PLAN 1–4 (1992), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dsm42e00/pdf; MILLER 
BREWING CO., MILLER BREWING COMPANY FIVE-YEAR PLAN 1992-1996, at 1–6 (1992), 
available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/psm42e00. 
 279. See Ross D. Petty, The Codevelopment of Trademark Law and the Concept of Brand 
Marketing in the United States Before 1946, 31 J. MACROMARKETING 87, 90. 93–94 (2011) 
(tracing the history of brand marketing, or trademark advertising, and the various studies 
conducted on consumer beliefs); see also supra notes 277–78.  See generally L. R. Geissler, 
Association-Reactions Applied to Ideas of Commercial Brands of Familiar Articles, 1 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 275 (1917) (studying consumers’ associations between brands and products). 
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registrants,280 trademark holders are likely the best party to bear the cost of 
understanding whether or not a regulatory measure actually causes consumers 
to switch brands.   
3.  Trademark Regulation Necessarily Affects Consumption 
Requiring trademark proprietors to show that consumers are switching to 
competitors’ goods or services furthers the presumptive goal of trademark 
restrictions: better-informed consumers.  As trademark restrictions and 
warning labels create better-informed consumers, the natural result is 
downward-sloping demand curves.  For example, Thailand’s proposed graphic 
warnings would cover thirty percent of alcohol containers.281  If, as a result of 
the warnings, a consumer drinks one fewer beer per day, then certainly an 
alcohol manufacturer will experience a decrease in sales.  Yet, that decrease is 
not tied to product distinction; rather, it is tied to a consumer acting on better 
information, which, therefore, has no effect on trademark competition, but 
presumably aids the objective of providing information.  If, on the other hand, 
a consumer switches to a competing beer, then the trademark holder has a 
more justifiable claim to compensation.   
When the United States banned the descriptors “light” and “low” from 
cigarette brands, it recognized that the elimination might lead some consumers 
to quit smoking and prevent others from staring to smoke.282  In a 
condemnation proceeding, requiring cigarette manufacturers to show that a 
regulation caused consumers to move to a competitor’s product would balance 
a state’s interest in better informing consumers with trademark proprietors’ 
interest in maintaining product distinction in the minds of consumers.283  Even 
if regulations ultimately engender distributional effects on market players (as 
regulations invariably do), they are unlikely, without more, to affect 
consumers’ positive associations with existing trademarks.284   
Determining the proper regulations for trademarks by placing the burden on 
trademark holders to show “consumer switching” may provide a superior 
standard to the now-prevailing paradigm, which essentially analogizes 
                                                 
 280. See supra notes 211–15, 272–75 and accompanying text. 
 281. SUKANYA SIRIKERATIKUL, USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN REPORT: DRAFT 
REGULATION ON ALCOHOL GRAPHIC WARNING LABELING 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.puntofocal.gov.ar/notific_otros_miembros/tha332_t.pdf. 
 282. FDA Seeks Comments on Misleading Labeling, ACTIONTOQUIT (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://actiontoquit.org/monthly_briefings/item/fda-seaks-comments-on-misleading-labeling/. 
 283. See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald v. Attorney General of Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 209 
(Can.) (discussing Canadian courts’ need to balance “between individual rights and community 
needs” in deciding whether a trademark regulation is an unlawful infringement). 
 284. See, e.g., Timothy P. Carney, Obama Teams with Philip Morris to Beat “Tobacco 
Industry”, WASH. EXAMINER, June 23, 2009, http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/2009/06 
/obama-teams-philip-morris-beat-tobacco-industry (discussing the minimal effect that tobacco 
regulations will have on major cigarette manufacturers). 
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trademarks to land for compensation purposes.285  Under that analogy, 
trademark holders would be entitled to compensation for lost sales of an 
associated product, even when those sales are not attributable to the 
trademark’s distinctive capacity.286  For example, a 1987 survey conducted by 
Forbes showed that only twenty-one percent of regular Marlboro smokers 
would purchase Marlboro cigarettes when offered in a plain brown package at 
half the cost.287  One might explain the phenomenon as consumers’ valuation 
of a brand name or disbelief that the cheaper, unmarked cigarettes actually 
were Marlboro cigarettes, rather than a cheap or counterfeit brand, which 
supports the source-identification function of trademarks.  In a regime under 
which all cigarette manufacturers are required to offer their products in plain 
packages, it is reasonable to assume that smokers will associate the origin of 
any given brand of cigarettes with the only distinguishing mark allowed: the 
manufacturer’s name in plain black font.288  If the trademark holder can show 
that its ability to compete was unlawfully harmed by a generally applicable  
plain-packaging regulation, only then does a compensable claim arise.289   
4.  Requiring Trademark Holders to Show Consumer Switching Encourages 
Firms to Internalize the Costs of Suggested or Implied Messages Across 
Product Lines 
Manufacturers and trademark holders in the tobacco, alcohol, and food 
industries shape implied or suggested messages across product lines.290  
Medical evidence shows, for example, that many smokers adopted a “light” 
version of a cigarette as a health measure, often as an alternative to quitting—a 
decision intentionally shaped by cigarette manufacturers.291  In the alcohol 
industry, brewers introduced “Ice,” “Lite Ice,” and “Lite” versions of their beer 
product lines to implicitly convey product qualities.292  Consumers associate 
                                                 
 285. See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006) (permitting a plaintiff to recover profits in 
the case of trademark infringement). 
 287. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Here’s One Tough Cowboy, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1987, at 108, 109. 
 288. See id. at 109 (discussing the importance of image and Marlboro packaging to 
consumers); see also Schechter, supra note 76, at 355–37 (relating the historical  
source-identification justification for trademarks, but rejecting its rationale in modern contexts). 
 289. See Becky Freeman, Simon Chapman & Matthew Rimmer, The Case for the Plain 
Packaging of Tobacco Products, 103 ADDICTION 580, 581 (2008). 
 290. See infra notes 291–307 and accompanying text. 
 291. Jean-Fraçois Etter et al., What Smokers Believe about Light and Ultra Light Cigarettes, 
36 PREV. MED. 92, 92 (2003) (concluding that smokers believe that advertising phrases like 
“light” mean that such cigarettes are safer); see also United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 
449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 430–31 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that cigarette manufacturers introduced the 
words “light” and “ultra-light” and similar terms into their brands with the explicit intention “to 
keep smokers smoking; to stop smokers from quitting; and to encourage people, especially young 
people, to start smoking”). 
 292. MILLER BREWING CO., MILLER BREWING COMPANY FIVE-YEAR PLAN 1992-1996, at 
8–10 (1994), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hyi95g00.pdf. 
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“Ice” with a beer that might taste better when served particularly cold, 
although the brewers’ real intent is to offer product lines with significantly 
higher alcohol content.293  Consumers may intuit that Bud Light has fewer 
calories and lower alcohol content than Budweiser, but may not guess that Bud 
Select has fewer calories, but higher alcohol content, than Bud Light.294   
Trademarks in the packaged food industry similarly imply health messages 
across product lines.  Kraft and Nestle offered frozen entrees styled “right” in 
an effort to lead consumers into choosing healthier, “nutritionally controlled” 
alternatives.295  Explaining Kraft’s decision to introduce its “Eating Right” 
brand, a Kraft report noted that consumers are “ignorant of actual levels of 
[sodium, fat, and cholesterol] which are appropriate or even too much.  
[Consumers w]ant [a] simple way to show them ‘what’s right.’”296  That 
product line competed with Nestle’s “Right Course” entrees.297  Descriptive 
terms like “right” or “select” may not reach the often-high “false” or 
“misleading” threshold set by deceptive-advertising laws.298  
The risk that trademark holders will imply health or other product attribute 
messages across product lines increases as global consolidation accelerates.299  
For example, only a few industry players dominate the global alcohol 
industry.300  In the beer market, for example,  
SABMiller controls roughly 15% of global volume and was once the 
largest brewer in the world, until 2008 when second-place InBev 
acquired third-place Anheuser-Busch to control about one fourth of 
global volume.  Still, SABMiller retains considerable scale.  Six of 
                                                 
 293. Id. at 8, 10. 
 294. See How Many Calories in Beer?, BEER100.COM, http://www.beer100.com/beer 
calories.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (listing the caloric amounts and alcohol content of 
domestic beers in the United States). 
 295. COLLEEN C. WELKE, ALL AM. GOURMET/BIRDSEYE, DRIVING FROZEN MEAL 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT: KRAFT EATING RIGHT 2 (1990), 
available at http://legacy.library.uscf.edu/tid/axt71f00/pdf. 
 296. Id. at 9. 
 297. Id. at 15. 
 298. See Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Can “Low-Fat” Nutrition Labels Lead to 
Obesity, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 605, 605–06 (2006) (detailing studies showing that relative 
nutritional claims, such as “low fat,” may lead to over-consumption). 
 299. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1552 (1999) (suggesting that a 
reduction in the number of competing enterprises diminishes the chance that they will advertise 
negative health information); see also Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnson, Reforming State 
Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 62–63 
(asserting that when the “quality” of certain products cannot be easily ascertained by consumers, 
“profit-driven” informational sources like consumer reports may fill the informational void). 
 300. See David H. Jernigan, The Global Industry: An Overview, 104 ADDICTION 6, 7 tbl.10, 
10 (Supp. I 2009) (showing the market share for the ten largest beer marketers and discussing 
how “a small group of large corporations . . . are able to promote their points of view effectively 
in global forums”). 
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[SABMiller’s] brands are among the top 50 in the world, and the 
firm has the number-one or number-two spot in more than 90% of 
the markets in which it competes, including China, India, the United 
States, and South Africa.301  
Similarly, in the tobacco industry, although there are seven major cigarette 
manufacturers, Philip Morris and British American Tobacco dominate the 
global market.302  In the global packaged and processed foods market, giants 
like Nestle, Danone, Unilever, Pepsi, and Kraft dominate.303  These industries 
are not always distinct.  Until 2007, Kraft shared its ownership structure with 
Philip Morris.304    
Regulators can force firms to internalize the costs that implied or suggested 
messages otherwise place on consumers by requiring trademark holders to 
show brand switching.  If regulators limit beer trademarks, for example, to a 
single variety per brand, the loss of one variety, such as “light,” will not injure 
a market player if consumers move to an alternative product line offered by the 
same player.  Awareness of the rule ex ante gives regulators an incentive to 
draw optimal boundaries around markets and players and places firms in a 
superior position to contest poorly drawn lines.305  Indeed, knowing that 
regulators will be free to condemn trademarks that do not affect market share 
may stimulate investments in higher quality products, instead of colorful or 
visceral imagery.306   
5.  Requiring Trademark Holders to Show Brand Switching Facilitates the 
Exposure of Regulatory Capture 
Regulation of images, words, signs, colors, and other distinguishing product 
features inevitably conflicts with the interests trademarks are meant to 
                                                 
 301. Ann Gilpin, SABMiller and A-B InBev Can Coexist, HEMSCOTT.COM (July 10, 2009, 
1:27 PM), http://www.hemscott.com/news/comment-archive/item.do?id=77809. 
 302. JUDITH MACKAY & MICHAEL ERIKSEN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO ATLAS 
50–51 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/atlas18.pdf. 
 303. ANITA REGMI & MARK GEHLHAR, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE INFORMATION 
BULLETIN 794: NEW DIRECTIONS IN GLOBAL FOOD MARKETS app. at 74 (2005), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib794/aib794App.pdf. 
 304. See Michael Arndt, It Just Got Hotter in Kraft’s Kitchen, BUS. WK., Feb. 12, 2007, at 36 
(discussing Altria’s spin off of Kraft Foods Inc. in 2007). 
 305. See, e.g., Vadi, supra note 49, at 801 (noting that ex-ante legislative approaches are 
more effective at achieving public-health goals than litigation); see also Comm’n of the European 
Cmtys., Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets Within the 
Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to Ex Ante Regulation in Accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/ED of the European Parliament and the Council on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communication Networks and Services, at 2–5 (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/rec_markets_en.pdf 
(discussing the purpose and benefits of ex-ante regulations in the context of electronic 
communications networks); supra Part I.C.5.a. 
 306. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
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protect.307  Because authorities cannot designate all possible combinations of 
letters, colors, frames, fonts, shapes, or characteristics in which manufacturers 
must disclose information, the framing of that information remains a key area 
in which manufacturers can and will compete.308   
These regulations are therefore subject to capture.309  Theories of regulatory 
capture predict that competitors endeavor to influence regulations in a way that 
either advantages one business interest or disadvantages a competitor.310  
Indeed, PMI made this allegation against Uruguay’s cigarette-packaging 
regulations.311  PMI’s chief competitor in Uruguay is an entirely domestic 
manufacturer.312  PMI therefore asserts that the law required it to withdraw 
seven of its twelve product lines from the market, but that its Uruguayan 
competitor merely renamed its brands in order to keep all of its variations on 
the market.313  PMI argues that the law effectively penalized PMI and 
subsidized its competitor.314  Using this Article’s proposal, if PMI can show 
that consumers are indeed switching to its competitors’ brands instead of 
switching to alternative PMI product lines, PMI can simply and inexpensively 
expose the regulations as unjustifiably benefiting the Uruguayan tobacco 
manufacturer over PMI.   
                                                 
 307. See Young, supra note 20; supra Part II.B. 
 308. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 
299, at 1466 (“When consumers are at least partially aware of health and safety risks, 
manufacturers have incentives to manipulate risk perceptions in the manner that benefits them 
most . . . .”). 
 309. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 685, 698–99 (2009) (providing an overview of the various forms of regulatory 
capture).  The concept of capture encapsulates the notion that agencies are often subject to 
influence or control by the industries that they regulate.  Id. at 698.  Capture may take the form of 
bribes in exchange for regulators’ support.  Id.  Capture may also occur when parties with a 
concentrated and particularized interest lobby regulators and lawmakers and capture them through 
public-choice theory.  Id. at 699.  Moreover, in certain cases, regulators may be able to obtain 
accurate information about the market and may become susceptible to the information 
disseminated by lobbyists on behalf of a particular entity.  Id. 
 310. See id. at 698–99; see also Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulations: 
Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & POL’Y 175, 176 (1992) 
(observing that capture “conveys a sense of illegitimate expropriation, performed by one powerful 
group over others, of the resources we might have thought were provided for a broader social 
benefit”). 
 311. See Philip Morris International Responds to Blatant Mischaracterization  
of Uruguayan Lawsuit, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 20, 2010, 12:19 PM), http:// 
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101120005010/en/Philip-Morris-International-Responds-
Blatant-Mischaracterization-Uruguayan. 
 312. See WEILER, supra note 246, at 15. 
 313. See id. at 17; Philip Morris International Responds to Blatant Mischaracterization of 
Uruguayan Lawsuit, supra note 311. 
 314. WEILER, supra note 246, at 14–15; Philip Morris International Responds to Blatant 
Mischaracterization of Uruguayan Lawsuit, supra note 311. 
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D.  Limitations and Qualifications 
1.  Initial, Not Final Burdens 
For the reasons articulated above, placing an initial evidentiary burden on 
trademark holders to show that a regulation causes consumers to switch to 
competing versions of goods or services makes good economic sense.315  
Trademark holders know the most about relevant markets and how to shape 
consumer perceptions; however, trademarks’ visual appeal may play an 
independent role in consumers’ decisions to purchase goods or services.  A 
consumer may participate in a market because he or she has an idiosyncratic 
affinity for a particular trademark’s colors, emotive content, or other 
aesthetic.316  Presumably, without that visual appeal, the consumer could 
decide to stop participating in the market, not because of a decision based on 
better information.317  
The short answer is that such a scenario is likely to take place in a relatively 
narrow range of products or services.  Consumers are unlikely to stop 
purchasing packaged food, automobiles, shoes, tools, cookware or a wide 
range of ultimately necessary items.   When considering regulations of less 
fundamental products like cigarettes and alcohol, both trademark holders and 
the state may submit evidence that, like all evidence in a condemnation 
proceeding, must be weighed in light of numerous factors.318  Regulators are 
likely to push for trademark restrictions on precisely these kinds of  
products—the ones that impose direct costs on governments.319  Also, 
regulators may be motivated to act because of a market failure, such as in the 
cigarette and alcohol industries, in which no player has an interest in exposing 
relevant consumer information.320  Regardless of regulators’ motivations in 
                                                 
 315. See supra Part II.C. 
 316. See Lunney, supra note 103, at 478 (observing the idiosyncratic nature of consumer 
preferences and the distinct affinity that individuals have regarding style and color). 
 317. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 318. See supra notes 224–28 and accompanying text. 
 319. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2000) (arguing that governments are poor 
substitutes for firms when discussing monetary incentives to guide behavior); see supra notes 
115–27 and accompanying text (detailing proposed alcohol and tobacco regulations and industry 
responses).  See generally Vadi, supra note 49 (discussing the interplay between the need for 
public-health regulations and the use of trademark protections to combat such regulations).  
Nevertheless, money might be more fungible with politics than Levinson’s analysis suggests.  
Governments have considered, and then rejected, proposed trademark regulations challenged on 
the basis of falling afoul of international intellectual-property instruments because of the potential 
cost of compensating trademark holders for their intellectual-property rights.  See supra notes 
237–40 and accompanying text. 
 320. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 97, 103–08 (2008) (discussing that cigarette-packaging regulations 
are necessary to inform consumers about the health effects of smoking partly because the 
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restricting trademarks or in requiring warnings that affect trademarks, it is 
reasonable to require that the state make reasonable efforts to investigate the 
market implications of such regulations.  In other words, the state may rebut 
trademark holders by submitting evidence of the value of the disclosed 
information to consumers.   
2.  Defining the Relevant Market 
This Article’s thesis depends on an implied, but not fully explored condition: 
that the relevant market for the goods and services represented by trademarks 
may be easily ascertained or determined.321  In jurisdictions that define and 
analyze markets before firm mergers or acquisitions as a measure to guard 
against anticompetitive effects, regulators scrutinize whether products or 
services are substitutable within a given geographic market.322  In the 
trademark context, the question becomes whether trademark holders would be 
able to show that a trademark restriction caused consumers to switch to a 
“substitutable” good or service.  For example, what if strong restrictions on 
cigarette trademarks caused consumers to switch to smokeless tobacco 
products?  Such a concern seems to pose little threat to the administration of 
the process outlined above because in markets regulators are likely to  
target—such as tobacco, alcohol, and processed food—the same industry 
players that dominate one product line dominate another.323  Indeed, trademark 
holders in these “mature” product markets appear to concede that their marks 
and trade names play a substantive role in retaining current consumers and 
causing other consumers to switch within the same product line.324   
It is entirely possible that trademark holders in mature product markets may 
attempt to introduce evidence that trademark restrictions or warning labels 
negatively affect a broader scope of products, beyond those specifically 
regulated.  Given adjudicators’ wide discretion with respect to evidence and 
disputed market realities, trademark holders’ attempts to expand relevant 
markets appear to be manageable.  
                                                                                                                 
competitive market alone will not provide that information and because no cigarette manufacturer 
benefits from exposing rivals’ smoking-related risks). 
 321. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 322. See Ioannis Kokkoris, Do Merger Simulation and Critical Loss Analysis Differ Under 
the SLC and Dominance Test?, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 249, 252 (2006). 
 323. See supra notes 300–05 and accompanying text. 
 324. Nobeleza Piccardo Unconstitutionality Claim, supra note 21, at 10 (“Products known as 
‘mature’ are those with a long trajectory on the market. These are products known by the general 
public and especially by those consuming them.  They are products that do not need advertising to 
be known . . . . The importance of advertising, in this type of products, stems from the 
distinguishing of the brand itself from that of the competitor. The purpose of such distinction is to 
attract to the brand clients that already consume the products of the competition, while at the 
same time maintaining the clients that use their own products.”). 
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III.  PROHIBITIONS: DISCRIMINATION AND IMMEASURABILITY 
As indicated in the beginning of this Article, the confrontation between 
protecting trademarks and regulating in the interest of consumer information 
costs has been played out extensively in the context of the corporate-speech 
debate.325  In the context of speech, the conversation quickly becomes both 
binary and strident and leaves inadequate room for compromise.  A trademark 
is either speech or it is not.326  Speech is either misleading or it is not.327  Yet 
even in the context of a regulatory taking, it is worth exploring some principles 
that might guide an adjudicator to conclude that a proposed regulation or a 
trademark may simply not be allowed. 328 
A.  Discrimination 
For trademark holders, the driving principle for prohibiting a regulation 
depends on proof of arbitrary discrimination.329  The benefit of imposing a 
burden on trademark holders to show consumer switching partly assists in 
exposing regulations that unjustifiably advantage or disadvantage 
competitors.330  Identifying the point at which a trademark holder’s right to 
compensation for such a loss reaches a sufficiently high level to justify a 
                                                 
 325. See supra note 19. 
 326. See Jude A Thomas, Fifteen Years of Fame: The Declining Relevance of Domain Names 
in the Enduring Conflict Between Trademark and Free Speech Rights, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10–14 (2011) (surveying the historical context and current debate over 
trademarks as constitutionally protected speech). 
 327. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 
737, 741 (2007) (articulating the Supreme Court’s standard that to be deemed false or misleading, 
commercial speech must be “actually or inherently misleading”). 
 328. This discussion has greater relevance for domestic regimes, such as regulatory-takings 
jurisprudence in the United States because, as a practical matter, international arbitration tribunals 
disfavor specific performance or equitable remedies.  See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 428 (2d ed. 2004); Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, 
Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same 
Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 56 (2008).  But see Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies 
in ICSID Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L 325, 326 (2004) (observing that the International Court of 
Justice has rendered judgments for specific performance in many instances). 
 329. Indeed, NAFTA as well as many other trade and investment agreements include this as 
an explicit requirement.  See NAFTA, supra note 36, at art. 1110 (requiring that an expropriation 
be nondiscriminatory); Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay On the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.–Uru., art. 5(1), Apr. 
22, 1991, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071 
/26/2/00021341.pdf (requiring that expropriation be conducted only “for the public benefit as 
established by law, on a non-discriminatory basis, and under due process of law, and provided 
that provisions be made for effective and adequate compensation”); see also Agreement Between 
the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay On the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, supra, at art. 3 (providing that neither party to an investment contract 
“shall . . . impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, extension, sale and, should it so happen, liquidation of such investments”). 
 330. See supra notes 283, 315 and accompanying text. 
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prohibition or injunction against state action is complicated, but entirely 
manageable. 
Consider the example of a market in which three firms’ trademarks compete: 
Eating Right, Healthy Choice, and Right Course.331  Let us say, a state 
prohibited the use of the word “Right” in connection with food because the 
regulator was concerned that the descriptor may mislead consumers as to one 
or more product qualities.  Such a regulation would disproportionately burden 
two of the three competitors in the relevant market.  One option would be to 
simply rely on the default rule and compensate “Right” trademark holders for 
any losses they can prove attributable to consumers switching brands as a 
result of the regulation.  A second option would be to empower  
dispute-settlement authorities to revise the regulation in light of competition in 
the relevant market.  A third option would be simply to prohibit the state from 
imposing a regulation that appears to discriminate so forcefully on two of the 
three market players.  As with defining relevant markets, there may be some 
peccadilloes in terms of manageability, but it appears that a compensation rule 
alone would create the right incentive for regulators to address both the 
“Right” and “Healthy” brand modifiers.   
B.  Immeasurability of Social Costs 
Partial or total prohibition of a trademark without compensation to an owner 
may be justified where a trademark imposes excessive or immeasurable 
costs.332  In such cases, a regulation against the use or sale of property 
represents a state’s decision that the costs overwhelmingly outweigh any 
potential economic benefits or the process of measuring the benefits and costs 
itself is unrealistic or unwise.333   
Indeed, in the speech context, this is precisely the basis upon which states 
justify trademark or other advertising prohibitions.334  Using the example of 
prohibitions of “light” or “mild” cigarettes, smokers may believe that these 
                                                 
 331. See generally WELKE, supra note 295 (comparing Kraft’s Eating Right frozen meals to 
competing products Right Course and Healthy Choice). 
 332. See Vadi, supra note 49, at 782 (observing that “in some cases excessive trade mark 
protection may have a negative impact on public health policies,” and further examining “the 
emerging trend in retaliating against trade marks for alleged violations of public policy norms”). 
 333. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2011 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBUNAL ENTITIES 4 (2011) (“[C]areful 
consideration of costs and benefits is best understood as a way of ensuring that regulations will 
improve social welfare . . . .”). 
 334. See Lindsey Sacher, Comment, From Stereotypes to Solid Ground: Reframing the Equal 
Protection Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and Its Application to Gender-Based College 
Admissions Policies, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1411, 1429 (2011) (noting that to restrict 
commercial speech, the government must show that the benefits of infringing on the speech 
outweigh the costs and that restriction will materially further the government’s purpose in 
remedying a purported harm). 
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cigarettes are healthier than “full-flavor” alternatives,335 and consumers’ use of 
“light” or “low-tar” cigarettes as a health measure reduces the chance of 
quitting.336  With respect to trademarks, the messages, images, and framing on 
product packaging may create credence qualities related to health that justify 
significant regulation or total prohibition.337  Therefore, this kind of speech is 
undeserving of protection.  In the property or takings context, the standard is 
translated into a cost-benefit analysis in which the costs are too large to be 
ascertainable.338  Measuring the value of individual health is too difficult or 
morally complex;339 thus, short of a trademark prohibition, an arbiter or judge 
must engage in the ghoulish enterprise of assigning a value to the health and 
lives of those who would have quit smoking instead of switching to a “light” or 
“low-tar” cigarette.340   
Even where it has decided to adopt a compensatory regime for trademark 
holders whose products affect human health, a state may nevertheless have a 
justifiable basis to “take” trademarks that have the effect of enticing children 
or adolescents.341  Partial or total trademark prohibitions are justified when 
they appeal to children for the same reasons that most jurisdictions prevent 
minors from entering into legally binding contracts, consenting to marriage, or 
                                                 
 335. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra notes 178–88 and accompanying text; see also Guido Calabresi & Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1222 (2003) 
(discussing how consumers need information through regulation to help them make the correct 
purchase decisions regarding their health). 
 338. See supra note 332 and accompanying text. 
 339. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207 (2004) (arguing that cost-benefit 
analyses systematically undervalue human life and health). 
 340. Alternatively, a type of “sin tax” could be levied on these products to recover the costs 
they impose.   See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic 
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1255 (1998).  One difficulty 
with that option is the measuring of intangibles like “discomfort, pain, and suffering,” which may 
accompany diseases associated with consumption of these products.  RESEARCH FOR INT’L 
TOBACCO CONTROL, AT WHAT COST? THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOBACCO USE ON NATIONAL 
HEALTH SYSTEMS, SOCIETIES, AND INDIVIDUALS: A SUMMARY OF METHODS AND FINDINGS  
24–25 (2003). 
 341. See Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Tobacco Promotion and the Initiation of Tobacco Use: 
Assessing the Evidence for Causality, 117 PEDIATRICS e1237, e1238–45 (2006) (discussing 
evidence from the United States and other countries to show that children and adolescents are a 
key target of tobacco industry branding).  The overwhelming majority of adolescents who smoke 
prefer the most heavily advertised brands.  See Ctrs. for Disease Control, Changes in the 
Cigarette Brand Preference of Adolescent Smokers—United States, 1989-1993, 43 MORBIDITY  
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 577 (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview 
/mmwrhtml/00032326.htm. 
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working in hazardous occupations.342  These restrictions stem from the view 
that children should be able to make decisions without being subject to the full 
range of long-term consequences imposed on adults for similar choices.343   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As governments increasingly bear the costs of their citizens’ consumption 
decisions or seek to facilitate the communication of accurate and relevant 
product information, trademarks will face increasing regulation.  Although 
regulations may take a number of forms like limiting certain graphics or colors 
or requiring that pictorial warnings cover large portions of product packaging, 
regulatory action must ultimately address consumers’ information costs.  
Pictorial warnings emerged in the alcohol, packaged food, and tobacco sectors 
because written, government-mandated labels warnings failed to communicate 
relevant health information effectively.344  Through pictorial, rather than 
written warnings, regulators attempt to bring information about long-term 
health effects as close to the time of purchase or consumption as possible.345  
Both warnings and trademark restrictions will ultimately generate disputes 
with trademark holders as to the holders’ rights to distinguish their products. 
This Article presents a basic framework for determining the state’s 
compensation for the condemnation of trademarks for a public purpose.  
Although in some jurisdictions, that debate occurs squarely within the context 
of permitted versus prohibited speech, many international forums are more 
likely to consider “property” or “investment” perspectives on trademarks and 
will need to develop frameworks for handling this unique form of intellectual 
property.  The standard now being articulated—an ambiguous but broadly 
defined “fair market value”—unhinges trademarks from the social benefits 
they are meant to provide.  Instead, trademark holders should be required to 
show that trademark restrictions cause consumers to switch to competitors’ 
versions of goods or services.  Trademark holders can adduce this information 
relatively inexpensively with an added benefit that such private policing will 
help check efforts to capture regulators.  This framework provides one method 
by which to determine the appropriate balance between trademark holders’ 
property rights, which permit them to distinguish their products, and the state’s 
interest in ensuring fully informed consumer decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
 342. Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Overview, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 3, 8 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69,524, 69,530–34 (Nov. 12, 2010). 
 345. See id. at 69,530–31 (noting that graphic warnings are more effective at alerting 
consumers to health warnings than textual warnings). 
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